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Does monetary policy act as a constraint on the quantity of bank credit? Does
it affect banks’ risk-taking? Do markets monitor banks’ risk-taking behavior? These
questions have important implications on our understanding of the consequences of
monetary policy and—in light of recent financial crises—on the design of macro-
prudential regulation.
I address these question in the context of thrifts—U.S. banks that specialize in
mortgage lending—in the years preceding the Sub-prime Crisis. Exploiting loan-level
data on banks’ lending, I find that the effects of monetary policy do not conform
to traditional theories of the bank lending channel : the quantity of small banks’
lending is not especially sensitive to monetary policy—it is larger banks that are
considerably more responsive. I also examine the cross-sectional effects of monetary
policy on banks’ risk-taking. Using a novel contemporaneous measure of banks’ risk-
taking that I construct from loan approval data, I find that less-capitalized banks’
increase risk-taking more in response to loose policy. This finding suggests that loose
policy leads to excessive risk-taking in the presence of agency problems between bank
owners and bank liability holders. Finally, I find mixed evidence on the role of market
monitoring. Following the economic turmoil of 2001, the market for bank deposits
appeared to take note of the differences in the riskiness of banks’ assets; however, the
effect declined gradually over the next few years—by the eve of the Sub-prime crisis,





The 2008 Sub-prime Crisis in the U.S. and the subsequent debt crises in Europe
have focused attention on financial intermediaries—banks broadly defined—and their
impact on the real economy. The run-up to the crises (2001–2007) was a period char-
acterized by relatively loose monetary policy, financial deregulation and innovation,
as well as declining underwriting standards in the housing sector. At the onset of the
crisis, weakness in the housing market caused sub-prime borrowers to default at high
rates, leading to a spate of failures in the financial sector. The resulting widespread
uncertainty about financial intermediaries’ solvency created considerable problems in
the money markets.
The post-crisis period was characterized by sustained efforts by the Federal Re-
serve to keep money markets functioning, with Fed policy driving interest rates down
to historic lows. Despite the Fed’s aggressive actions, the economy entered a pro-
longed and severe recession; after six years of unambiguously expansive policy, the
U.S. unemployment rate still stands at nearly 8%.
In retrospect, the declines in underwriting standards in the pre-crisis period appear
excessive. The oft-cited anecdotes of mortgages being issued to borrowers with no
income, no assets, and no down payment may border on caricature, but one that
1
has the ring of truth. But to accept that risk-taking during this period was ex-ante
inefficient raises questions as to the origins of the inefficiency. Was it a matter of
monetary policy being too loose? Was deregulation and financial innovation in the
financial sector pervert the incentives of bank owners or managers? If so, did loose
monetary policy contribute to this perversion? And why did markets fail to restrain
the excesses?
In the post-crisis period, the slow rate of recovery raises questions about the effi-
cacy of monetary policy. Certainly, things could have been much worse: at the height
of the Great Depression, the unemployment rate topped 35% and only returned to
pre-crash levels after the U.S. entry into World War II1. If—as is frequently argued—
the experience of the 1930s is a case study in the consequences of an inadequate
monetary policy response to a crisis, the recent post-crisis experience may offer a
case study in the limits to the effectiveness of monetary policy. The response to the
Sub-prime Crisis and the broader U.S. financial crisis has not been timid: consistently
expansionary policy has led to negative real interest rates and a three-fold expansion
of the monetary base. The low rates and the glut of new bank reserves has not led
to a robust recovery; this raises long-standing questions about how monetary policy
works. In particular, what is the role of banks in monetary policy transmission?
While formal macro-economic models tend to ignore banks, it has long been rec-
ognized that negative developments in the banking sector can lead to significant
disruption to the real economy. The danger of such disruptions has led governments
to adopt policies designed to mitigate them. Examples include lender of last resort
facilities, depositor insurance schemes, capital and reserve requirements, restrictions
on banks’ activities, and various forms of bank supervision. As a consequence, the
functioning of the banking sector is as much driven by the design of banking regula-
tion as by market forces. Due to banks’ important role in the allocation of capital,
1. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 Part I (1975). Series D-I-10
“Labor Force and its Components 1900–1947”
2
the payment system, and their potential role in the transmission of monetary policy,
the success of policy-maker’s design efforts is an important question.
1.2 Overview
In the following chapters, I examine several issues relating to the design of the
banking system with implications to the recent crisis. First, I examine the issue of how
monetary policy affects the supply of bank credit. The recent post-crisis experience
suggests that a banking system awash with reserves does not necessarily lead to major
increases in bank lending. This observation runs counter to predictions of the bank
lending channel developed in Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998) in which
regulatory reserve requirements endow banks with a special role in the transmission
of monetary policy: bank reserves serve as the key constraint on the quantity of bank
lending. Thus, monetary policy’s effects on the quantity of bank reserves should affect
the quantity of credit available to bank-dependent borrowers. Earlier studies of the
bank lending channel have produced mixed results (Altunbaş, Fazylov, and Molyneux
(2002)), with the U.S. evidence tending to be support this view (canonically, Anil K
Kashyap and Stein (2000)). I revisit this issue in a cleaner empirical setting using
data covering a period during which banks operated under a “modern” regulatory
environment and consistent monetary arrangements.
The bank lending channel is just one part of broader set of proposed credit chan-
nels of monetary policy transmission (see for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995))
which are characterized by monetary policy affecting the supply of bank credit. In-
terest in the credit channels arose due to perceived shortcomings in the standard
neoclassical channel of monetary policy transmission in which monetary policy oper-
ates exclusively through the cost of capital. My analysis of the supply of bank credit
finds that a credit channel is operational; however, my results are inconsistent with
the traditional conception of the bank lending channel and suggest that a different
3
supply mechanism is at work.
Second, I consider monetary policy’s effects on bank’s risk-taking. It is frequently
noted by economic historians that financial crises tend to follow periods of loose
monetary policy, with the suggestion that “easy money” plays a role in excessive
risk-taking.2 However, economic theory provides little in the way of a formal justi-
fication for this view. Standard portfolio theory predicts that—under fairly general
conditions—reductions in the risk-free rate induce agents to shift their portfolios
towards riskier assets. Such shifts cannot be described as “excessive”: reductions
in the discount rate increase the value of assets and hence agents’ wealth, which—
under declining relative risk aversion—leads agents to tilt their portolio allocations
toward riskier assets. Similarly, lower discount rates may render more projects vi-
able, and to the extent that these marginally viable projects are riskier, this can lead
to increased risk-taking in the economy. Again, this mechanism cannot be said to
represent an excessive response. My focus here will be on a less benign factor in
banks’ risk-taking—agency problems resulting from leverage (i.e. low bank capital)
and its interaction with monetary policy. I exploit loan-level data to construct a novel
measure of risk-taking that is contemporanous, and hence well-suited to an analysis
of banks’ risk-taking response to monetary policy. I find evidence broadly consistent
with loose policy exacerbating agency problems at under-capitalized banks, suggesting
an inefficient response due to shortcomings in the regulatory design.
Finally, I examine the role of depositors in monitoring banks’ risk-taking. The ex-
tent to which depositors are capable of monitoring banks actions is an important issue
in the design of the banking system. If, as is commonly maintained, depositors offer
little in the way of monitoring and are prone to panics resulting from “sun-spot” equi-
libria,3 then a system in which banks exposed to significant agency problems compete
2. See for example, Allen and Gale (2007); however Galbraith (1955) takes issue with this prepo-
sition.
3. See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for the canonical exposition of this view.
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for deposits is bound to produce inefficient outcomes. Alternatively, depositors may
perform valuable monitoring functions that cannot easily be duplicated by regulators
such as acting quickly on information that is difficult to quantify. 4 Hence, an un-
derstanding depositors’ capabilities is critical to the design of the regulatory system.
If depositors’ capabilities are very limited, bank monitoring may be best left to the
regulators, with limits on competition for deposits and enhanced deposit guarantees.
If on the other hand, depositors capabilities are significantly complimentary to those
of the regulators, then depositors’ incentives to exercise these capabilities may need
to be enhanced through increased competition and reduced deposit guarantees.
1.3 Approach
My approach is to examine these issues in the context of thrifts—banks that spe-
cialize in mortgage lending—in the years preceding the recent sub-prime crisis. The
motivation for studying thrifts is four-fold. First, thrifts’ activities in the pre-crisis
period were (and continue to be) heavily concentrated in real-estate lending (specifi-
cally consumer mortgage lending); the present crisis—as well as many other banking
crises—has its origins this sector.5 Second, due to a statutorily-imposed lack of di-
versification, thrifts provide an unobstructed view of the interactions between bank
policies, macro-economic developments, demand for credit, and the supply of funding;
thrifts are simple and relatively homogeneous with respect to their business model:
unlike commercial banks, thrifts do not engage in significant investment banking,
4. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) offer a stylized characterization of this view to explain the fragility
of the banking system.
5. Recently, the Irish, U.K, and Spanish banking crises were all related to asset price bubbles in the
property markets. The collapse of the Thai real estate market in 1997 has been cited as precipitating
the subsequent East Asian currency and banking crises (see Renaud, Zhang, and Koeberle (2001)).
Similarly, the Scandinavian banking crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s feature asset price
bubbles in real estate as proximate causes (see Englund (1999) for a discussion of the Swedish
experience). Suggestively, the U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s was preceded by
a boom in home prices. On a related note, Bernanke (1983) argues that the rapid increase in
mortgage indebtedness during the 1920s contributed to the severity of the Great Depression.
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proprietary trading, or commercial lending—nor do they have much of an interna-
tional presence.6 By and large, thrifts focus on two activities: mortgage banking,
viz. originating loans for sale in the secondary market (the originated-to-distribute
(OTD) model), and traditional bank lending, viz. collecting deposits to fund holdings
of loans and securities. Thrifts’ lack of complexity, the homogeneity in their busi-
ness model, and the regulatory-imposed lack of alternative investment opportunitites
greatly simplifies their analysis. Moreover, the thrift—in many important respects—
bears a closer resemblance to the banks of financial theory, then does the commercial
bank. Third, because U.S. regulations require the disclosure of loan-level data of
banks’ mortgage applications, thrifts’ credit demand is largely observable. Finally,
because thrifts are subset of the bank population that is rarely used in studies of bank
lending, they represent a unique opportunity to perform “out of sample” tests.
1.4 Context
Broadly, the following chapters are related to several strands of the finance and
macroeconomic literature. Common to each is the idea that financial intermediaries
(i.e. banks) matter—that we do not live in a Miller-Modigliani world where banking is
nothing but a veil. The credit models of Bernanke and Gertler (1987) and Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) are common theoretical starting points. In these models, shocks to
the banks affects their ability to supply credit in the economy. These credit supply
shocks generate real economic effects through bank-dependent borrowers. Recent
studies documenting such effects include Chava and Purnanandam (2011) who show
the 1998 Russian debt crisis decreased credit to firms dependent on banks with a
Russian exposure, and Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen (2011) who find that German banks
6. There are of course exceptions; the failed (international) insurance giant AIG operated as a
thrift holding company. However, this was atypical even for the largest thrifts: very large thrifts
such as Washington Mutual Bank and Country-wide Financial followed a relatively simple—albeit
risky—strategy of lending on houses.
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exposed to the U.S. subprime crisis reduced local retail lending post-crisis. These
studies offer fairly direct refutations of the Miller-Modigliani world.
Here, my goal is somewhat different: I do not set out to provide evidence for (or
measure) banks’ relevance—rather, I take this for granted and aim instead to examine
some of the mechanisms that affect banks’ credit supply.
Much of the post-crisis literature has focused on the role of large, complex fi-
nancial institutions (LCFIs), the growth of the subprime market, the development
of “shadow banks”, financial innovations such as the originate-to-distribute (OTD)
business model, and the moral hazard stemming from “too big too fail” (TBTF) type
guarantees.7 Many of these changes have in turn been linked to extensive financial
innovation and liberalization (or rather, deregulation). In the aftermath of the crisis,
many of the reforms that have been advocated, recommended, and enacted aim to
reduce the systemic risk created by the LCFIs, curtail the ills of OTD, and limit
TBTF guarantees that undermine market monitoring, foster moral hazard, and gen-
erate popular discontent by returning—in various degrees—to the status quo ante.
Such proposals often prominently feature separating (or “ring-fencing”) traditional
banking activities from other, riskier activities such as market making, proprietary
trading, and investment banking.8 However, as has been noted by various commenta-
tors (see for example Goodhart (2012), or Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)), the boom and
bust cycles at the heart of the recent crisis, as well as the crisis itself, are anything
but new: the extent to which a return to the status quo ante could prevent these
problems in the future is an important open question on which my research will shed
7. The significance of subprime lending is documented in Mian and Sufi (2009). The shadow
banking system is discussed in Gorton (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2010)). Agency issues in the
originated-to-distribute (OTD) model are documented by Keys et al. (2010). A discussion of agency
issues at modern financial intermediaries in general can be found in Rajan (2006). Richardson et al.
(2010) provides a discussion of LCFIs and the TBTF problem.
8. Arguments to this effect can be found in Richardson et al. (2010). U.K.’s Independent Commis-
sion on Banking (Vickers et al. (2011)), the proposals of the E.U. Expert Group (Liikanen (2012)),
and the Volcker Rule of the 2010 Dodd-Frank legislation, feature ring-fencing, legal separation, or
prohibitions on various non-traditional activities as central tenets.
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light.
In the subsequent chapters, I first describe thrifts—the banks that serve as the
subject of my analysis. In Chapter III I analyze monetary policy and the supply of
bank credit. In Chapter IV, I turn my attention to its effect on banks’ risk-taking.





Thrifts’ front-row seats to the Sub-prime Crisis makes them interesting in its own
right.1 However, their role in the U.S. economy has been declining for some time, and
the future viability of the thrift charter is in doubt.2 Thus, thrifts’ experience is most
valuable if it sheds light on mechanisms operating in a broader banking context. I
shall argue that in the “inter-crisis” period marked by the Savings and Loan Crisis in
the early 1990s and the recent Sub-prime Crisis, thrifts’ experience did have relevance
on the broader bank population.
Over the inter-crisis period—and unlike over any other prior period in their long
history—thrifts functioned very much like their non-thrift banking contemporaries:
they could issue the same types of liabilities, their deposits were insured by the same
agency, they were subject to the same reserve and capital regulations, and they had
equal access to the same lender of last resort facilities. The major difference was that
thrifts were subject to the Qualified Thrift Lender test, which required 65% of assets
to be invested in residential mortgage loans and other qualified consumer loans (and
1. Among depository institutions, thrifts are at the top of the leaderboard of the largest bank
failures. Notable thrift failures include Washington Mutual Bank, IndyMac, and AIG.
2. With the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the (few) remaining advantages of the thrift charter
were largely eliminated.
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prohibited thrifts from holding more than 10% of assets in commercial loans).3
In earlier periods, thrifts’ large holdings of residential mortgage assets would have
been enough to render them quite distinct from the rest of the bank population.
Residential, fixed-rate, amortizing mortgage loans are not a traditional bank asset:
they have long durations, limited liquidity, and entail significant interest rate risk.4
Historically, commercial banks avoided them and preferred instead to invest in liquid,
short-term commercial paper. With the growth of government-sponsored enterprises
(GSEs), mortgage securitization, and legal changes permitting the issuance of ad-
justable rate mortgages, mortgage assets lost much of this distinctness: loans con-
forming to GSE specifications became some of the most liquid of bank assets, while
the less liquid, non-conforming loans were increasingly structured as adjustable-rate
products with short durations. This, coupled with post-war growth in commercial
banks’ residential mortgage lending made thrifts’ activities significantly less distinct.
This had not always been the case: thrifts—whose origins go back to British building
societies of the eighteenth century—were once quite different from their commercial
bank contemporaries. The evolution of the thrift from its decidedly non-bank origins
to its present—bank-like—form can be attributed to two major events: the Great
Depression and the Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis.
Great Depression
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, thrifts—then building soci-
eties and mutual savings banks—bore little resemblance to commercial banks of the
3. Much of the appeal of the the Federal thrift charter was due to thrifts’ ability to branch
across state lines; however, with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994, much of this relative advantage was lost. It should also be noted
that thrift regulation was largely consolidated in the Office of Thrift Supervision (at least for thrifts
with Federal charters) whereas commercial banks were subject to various overlapping regulation
by states, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and/or the Federal Reserve Board.
4. Legal restrictions prevented banks from issuing adjustable-rate mortgages for much of the
post-war period. See Peek (1990) for a discussion.
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time.5 Thrifts were dominant players in intermediated mortgage lending with a near
monopoly in the issuance of the now-standard amortizing mortgages; thrifts’ assets
consisted of mortgages and very little else.6 Conversely, commercial banks played a
very small role in mortgage lending; their assets primarily consisted of short-term
corporate paper.7 The liabilities of commercial banks and thrifts were also quite
different. Commercial banks issued (interest-free) demand deposits which facilitated
the payment system. Thrifts on the other hand were funded with less liquid liabil-
ities: building societies issued shares or participations while mutual savings banks
issued savings accounts. Both forms of liability could only be redeemed with notice
and in the case of building societies’ shares offered no guarantee as to the eventual
redemption value.
The relative illiquidity of thrifts’ liabilities did not spare them in the Great Depres-
sion. Thrifts’ lending was severely disrupted by foreclosures, deteriorating economic
conditions, and problems of confidence leading to redemption requests and deposit
outflows.8 The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 was aimed at mitigating prob-
lems in the mortgage sector. It established the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB)
5. Thrifts have largely been neglected not only by students of finance, but also by students of
history; of the few historical treatments, Mason (2004) provides an excellent account, on which much
of the following is based.
6. For mutual savings banks of the time, it is more accurate to say that their loan portfolio
consisted of mortgages and very little else. Mutual savings banks did hold buffer stocks of liq-
uid securities primarily consisting of government and railway bonds. These holdings represented
approximately one third of total assets (see Hart (1938), Tables 14,15)
7. The role of various intermediaries in mortgage lending is documented by Snowden (1995),
who reports that toward the end of the nineteenth century, thrifts (i.e. mutual savings banks
and building societies) held 72% of all mortgage assets held by financial intermediaries. At this
time, commercial banks held only 3% of these assets. The rest were held by insurance companies
and finance companies. Outside the thrift sector, lending for residential real estate financing was
provided at generally unfavorable terms: loan-to-value ratios were often in the 50% range and such
loans were typically “bullet” loans with short maturities (1–5 years). Snowden attributes this to
agency problems in long-distance lending, illiquidity of mortgage paper, and commercial banks’
reluctance to undertake the maturity-transformation role now generally cited (canonically in Bryant
(1980) or Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) as banks’ raison d’être.
8. The problems were most pronounced in the building societies. Hart (1938) reports (Table 11)
that between 1931 and 1936, building societies’ assets dropped from $8.4 billion (with $6.0 billion in
mortgages) to $5.6 billion (with $3.3 billion in mortgages) while membership fell from approximately
11 million to 6 million.
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system and the Federal Savings and Loan Association charter, under which thrifts
could access a lender of last resort facility similar to that provided to commercial
banks by the Federal Reserve through its discount window.9
Shortly thereafter, the National Housing Act of 1934 established Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)—a deposit insurance scheme similar to the
newly created Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), but aimed at the thrift
lenders. Prior to this, the business models in the thrift sector were an adaptation to
the problems of agency and illiquidity central to mortgage lending. Thrifts overcame
these problems through a combination of small scale, directors’ “good name” in the
local community, mutual-ownership, or reliance on less liquid liabilities.
With the FHLB and FSLIC, the rules of the game changed considerably. By
1937, approximately thirteen hundred institutions obtained the new Federal Savings
and Loan Charter, and the 3,886 thrifts belonging to the FHLB system came to
be responsible for 41% of new (intermediated) mortgage originations, while FHLB-
eligible institutions held 86% of intermediated mortgage assets (Fahey (1937), Tables
B and C). In the post-war housing housing boom, thrifts were able to maintain their
dominance in home lending and significantly expanded their economic importance.
By 1980, thrifts (savings and loans and mutual savings banks) held 19% of the total
financial assets held by all financial services firms; this was a little more than half
of commercial banks holdings (37%). By comparison, in 1945 thrifts played a much
smaller role in the banking sector: they held only 10% of total financial assets while
commercial banks held 65% (see Barth (1991), Table 2-1). This growth in the role
of thrifts reflected fundamental changes in the business of banking. No longer were
commercial banks focused on discounting commercial bills and providing working
capital finance by interest-free demand deposits; increasingly, they were a source of
9. The FHLB was open to “savings and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead asso-
ciations, life-insurance companies, and mutual savings banks, either State, or federally chartered”
(Fahey (1937)).
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funds for long-term investment projects funded through interest-bearing liabilities
like savings accounts and certificates of deposit. In this sense, commercial banks were
starting to resemble thrifts.
Savings and Loan Crisis
The second historical episode critical to shaping the modern thrift was the Savings
and Loan Crisis of the 1980s—it is here that the modern thrift truly came into
being. Thrifts’ focus on mortgage lending became a serious problem during Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s battle with inflation in the early 1980s. At the time,
thrifts were subject to significant restrictions on their permitted activities including
prohibitions on the issuance of variable rate mortgages and limitations on commercial
lending. These restrictions left thrifts holding an undiversified portfolio with a large
asset-liability mismatch. This led to a growing gap between thrifts’ income and
expense: their portfolio of long-term fixed-rate mortgage assets (originated years
earlier) was not covering the increasing cost of short-term funding—a cost that was
only increasing under the Fed’s anti-inflation policies.
Early legislative responses did little to solve thrifts’ problems but left a lasting
legacy. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 eliminated Regulation Q limits on deposit
interest rates, regularized reserve requirements, gave thrifts access to the Fed discount
window, and permitted thrifts to offer transaction accounts; but, it did nothing to
address the restrictions on thrifts’ lending activities. Although transaction accounts
provided a new, low-cost source of funds and access to the discount window mitigated
thrifts’ liquidity problems, the elimination of interest rate ceilings only made thrifts’
negative interest margin problem more acute. It was only with the Garn-St. Ger-
main Act of 1982 that restrictions on thrifts’ permitted activities were finally relaxed:
thrifts were permitted to diversify into commercial lending, limits on loan-to-value
ratios were removed, and restrictions on adjustable-rate mortgages were scaled back
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(although not eliminated). This also marked the beginning of a period characterized
by increasingly lax regulatory oversight: additional legislation and a series of regula-
tory rulings further expanded thrifts’ permitted activities, relaxed accounting rules,
and encouraged the use of regulatory forbearance. By this time, thrifts’ financial
circumstances were so dire that the lax regulatory climate only exacerbated moral
hazard problems which were manifested through “gambling for resurrection” strate-
gies (Brewer and Mondschean (1994)) and outright theft (Akerlof et al. (1993)). The
resulting binge of risk-taking and thievery culminated in the Savings and Loan Crisis,
which was characterized by widespread thrift failures, insolvencies in state insurance
funds, and the eventual failure of the FSLIC.
To resolve the crisis, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). With this legislation, restrictions on thrifts’
permitted activities were reinstated and strengthened. Under the Qualified Thrift
Lender (QTL) test (a measure of “thriftiness”), 70% of a thrift’s asset were to be
related to residential lending. Failure to pass the test would prevent access to FHLB
advances, restrict branching powers, and place limits on the payment of dividends.
Thrifts’ commercial lending activities were limited to 20% of assets, with lending
to large firms (i.e. firms not qualifying as “small businesses”) further limited to
a maximum 10% of assets.10 In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the
much maligned regulator of the Savings and Loans) was eliminated and replaced with
the newly formed Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
One thing FIRREA did not do was turn back the clock. Aside from the QTL
restrictions, few distinctions between thrifts and commercial banks would remain
post-FIRREA: both could issue the same types of deposits (now insured by the FDIC),
they would both be subject to the same reserve and capital requirements, and they
would both operate under similar tax regimes. In addition, thrifts and commercial
10. This does not appear to have been a binding constraint for most thrifts. For example, in
1992:IV, real estate loans made up 93% of thrifts’ loan holdings. In 2007:II, they made up 86%.
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banks would enjoy access to the same liquidity facilities: FIRREA extended access to
FHLB advances to commercial banks, and thrifts’ access to the Fed’s discount window
(granted by the MCA of 1980) continued intact. One remaining point of difference
was that Federally-chartered thrifts continued to enjoy greater branching powers post-
FIRREA than commercial banks—they could engage in de novo branching in any
state (only subject to approval from the OTS). But even this distinction would not
last long: in 1994, the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
(IBBEA) greatly expanded commercial banks’ ability to branch across state lines.
Thus, toward the start of the inter-crisis period, thrifts did not retain significant
distinctive features besides the restrictions on the composition of their assets: put
simply, they were banks specializing in mortgage lending.
The relative lack of variation in the asset-side activities of the thrifts in the years
following FIRREA makes them an attractive empirical setting. At the time, the
commercial bank population was large and diverse, ranging from the simple—local
banks focusing on small business and mortgage loans—to the complex—international
money-center banks engaging in all types of financial activities. In contrast, the
thrift population was relatively homogeneous; thrifts all did essentially the same
thing: they borrowed funds (primarily through deposits) and used these funds to
issue loans (primarily mortgage loans).11 Because of this homogeneity in the business
model, studies of lending at a modern thrift are less susceptible to omitted variables
likely to bias studies of commercial banks’ lending activity.12 However, there was one
feature of this period that makes for some complications: the growth of mortgage
securitization.
11. Increasingly, thrifts also engaged in the related business of mortgage banking, which I discuss
below.
12. For example, a commercial bank with significant exposure to C&I and residential mortgage
loans can change the composition of its balance sheet (altering the mix of new residential and
commercial loans). This ability makes it difficult to interpret changes in lending activity. Similarly,
differences in the use of loan commitments (to customers or off-balance-sheet entities) cause similar
issues.
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The Modern Thrift and Securitization
The role of securitization in mortgage lending is significant and has received con-
siderable attention (see Gorton (2010) for details). Market-based holdings of mortgage
assets first exceeded bank’s on-balance-sheet holdings around 1990 (Adrian and Shin
(2008)). Such holdings have only increased, and by now account for approximately
two thirds of all mortgage assets.
With continued growth in securitization in the 1990s, the typical thrift engaged
in two related lines of business: mortgage banking and bank lending. In the for-
mer, the thrift would originate loans for sale in the market (i.e. the OTD model),
while in the latter it would issue loans funded through deposits (i.e. the traditional
banking model). Both businesses required essentially identical skills—screening and
servicing—but the types of loans that were originated in each reflected institutional
features of the market for mortgage-backed securities as well as thrifts’ portfolio con-
siderations.
In the market for mortgage-backed securities, guarantees provided by the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) ensured a virtually inexhaustible source of funding for
loans “conforming” to GSE standards. By and large, these conforming loans were
conventional, fixed-rate loans. A liquid forward market in GSE pools made up of
such loans (described in some detail in Vickery and Wright (2010)) kept a tight lid
on the yield spreads of conforming loans. While fixed-rate conforming loans became
a staple of mortgage securitizations, their attractiveness as a thrift asset was limited:
low yield spreads generated low returns, and their fixed-rate terms created significant
exposure to interest rate risk. Given their unpleasant experiences in the 1980s, thrifts
were eager to avoid this exposure. With the elimination of restrictions on the issuance
of adjustable-rate mortgages (with FIRREA in 1989) thrifts were finally able to do
so.
Funding adjustable-rate loans through the balance sheet while selling (eligible)
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fixed-rate loans into the market became an attractive strategy for thrifts in the 1990s.
Although data on the terms of banks’ mortgage loans is rather limited, by the end of
1997 thrifts reported that 75% of their on-balance-sheet mortgage loans were sched-
uled to re-price or mature within 15 years or less; this suggests that the traditional
thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage was playing an decreasing role on thrifts’ balance
sheets.13
Securitizing fixed-rate loans while funding adjustable-rate loans through the bal-
ance sheet can have significant—and somewhat counter-intuitive—implications for
the dynamics of a bank’s loan growth and its interaction with monetary policy. For
mortgage borrowers, interest rates affect not only the overall demand for credit, but
also the relative attractiveness of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate products. Informally,
when long-term rates are high, borrowers prefer adjustable-rate loans. This idea is
developed formally in Koijen, Hemert, and Nieuwerburgh (2009), who attribute the
time-series variation in borrowers’ preferences to time-series variation in the bond
premium. They propose that borrowers employ a simple “rule of thumb” to esti-
mate the bond premium using the difference between the long rate and the average
of recent short rates. If monetary policy affects long-term rates (through standard
expectations-based mechanisms), this can lead to situations where monetary tighten-
ings increase the demand for bank credit (at the expense of market-funded credit).
Under the rule of thumb, higher long-term rates lead to higher estimates of the bond
premium, resulting in borrowers’ substitution away from fixed-rate loans (funded by
the market) into adjustable-rate loans (funded through bank balance sheets).14 This
highlights the importance of a bank’s product mix in its lending activity.
13. Based on aggregate figures from the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions; 1997 is the
first year for which re-pricing data is available. Because few conventional thirty year loans “survive”
for fifteen years (the average duration of such loans is approximately seven years), the 75% figure
consists largely of fixed-rate loans originated with shorter terms (e.g. construction loans, balloon
loans, fifteen and twenty year fixed-rate loans) and adjustable-rate loans.
14. There is some debate on the extent of monetary policy’s effects on long-term interest rates; see
Berument and Froyen (2009) for a survey and some evidence.
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An Anecdote: Washington Mutual Bank
For some additional insight on thrifts’ portfolio decisions, I turn to some anecdotal
evidence from the annual reports of Washington Mutual Bank (WAMU), which—on
account of its failure in 2008—is perhaps one of the most infamous thrifts, and—due to
its SEC filings—one of the more transparent. WAMU is interesting because at its peak
it was the largest thrift. Due to its large scale, WAMU was relatively unconstrained in
implementing its portfolio strategy: it had access to the most sophisticated personnel
and technologies, and would have been least affected by transaction costs (say in
hedging). Despite this, WAMU’s strategy was very much in line with the simple
description provided earlier in this section: it originated fixed-rate loans for sale and
used its balance sheet for adjustable-rate loans.
Washington Mutual Inc., was a savings and loan holding company formed in a 1994
reorganization of Washington Mutual Saving Bank. The bank’s history dates back
to 1889, but it was in the late 1980s that it began its spectacular rise. Between 1988
and 1996, it completed no fewer than twenty acquisitions which turned Washington
Mutual into a major lender in the North-West. With the reorganization and the
subsequent acquisitions of American Savings Bank (ASB) and Great Western Bank
(GWB)—two of California’s largest mortgage lenders—WAMU would become the
nation’s largest thrift (and eighth largest banking company), with over $160 billion
in assets.
At the end of 1996—toward the beginning of the inter-crisis period—WAMU had
$45 billion in assets and operated approximately 500 branches.15 The company’s
activities included mortgage lending, commercial banking, insurance, as well as a full-
service securities brokerage and investment advisory service. As a thrift, WAMU was
subject to the QTL and the majority of its assets were restricted to residential loans
and other qualified consumer and small business loan products. Of its $45 billion
15. This is the earliest date for which SEC 10-K filings are available.
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in assets, $30 billion consisted of direct lending, with approximately $26 billion in
residential and consumer loans (and less than $400 million in commercial loans).
According to WAMU’s 1996 10-K filing, one of the its major goals was to “limit
the sensitivity of interest rate movements”. This was to be achieved through “the re-
tention of internally originated adjustable-rate mortgages”. It is also noted that the
company has “decreased the percentage of fixed-rate assets and increased the per-
centage of adjustable-rate assets in its loan and investment portfolios”, and that “the
Company securitized and then sold a substantial portion of the fixed-rate loans it orig-
inated, while retaining nearly all of its adjustable-rate loan production”. The report
projects “that a portion of the remaining fixed-rate securities may be replaced with
adjustable-rate GSE MBS, adjustable-rate private-issue MBS, collateralized mortgage
obligations, and purchased loan pools as well as new originations of ARMs, as the
fixed-rate securities pay down or are sold as market conditions permit”. In short, the
company’s lending operations consisted of a mortgage banking business originating
fixed-rate products for sale in the market and a tradition bank lending business orig-
inating adjustable rate mortgage products, construction loans, and other short-term
loans for retention on the balance sheet.
The pursuit of this two-pronged strategy was evident in WAMU’s financial state-
ments. During 1996, its real estate loan originations totaled $12 billion, of which
$3.7 billion was in fixed-rate single-family residential (SFR) loans. Of the $12 bil-
lion in originated loans, approximately $2 billion were sold and the vast majority of
these were fixed-rate SFR loans. Thus, most of the bank’s origination activity was
destined for the balance sheet and attributable to the traditional bank lending. Of
the $10 billion funded through the balance sheet, the bulk ($6.2 billion) consisted of
adjustable-rate SFR loans, with the remainder a mixture of construction loans ($1.3
billion), consumer loans ($1.3 billion), and commercial loans ($350 million).
The annual report also makes clear the previously discussed effect of interest rates
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on the composition and disposition of originated loans. It is noted that the “ability
to originate ARMs in lieu of fixed-rate loans [had] varied in response to changes in
market interest rates.” These swings could be very large: during 1992–1993 (when
interest rates were low), adjustable-rate originations constituted 25% of of residential
originations, and “when interest rates rose in 1994”, adjustable-rate originations shot
up to 62%.
2.2 Data Sources
The samples used in subsequent analyses cover thrifts’ lending activity in the inter-
crisis years; starting in 1992 and ending in 2006. The year 1992 is a natural place to
start in that it marks the approximate start of the inter-crisis period. Practically, it
is the first year for which much of the data is available. In most of my analyses, I end
in 2006 in order to ensure that the sample covers relatively normal times. The data
on thrifts’ lending comes from two two sources: thrifts’ quarterly regulatory filings,
and their annual loan-level disclosures mandated by the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA).
Thrift Financial Reports
The main bank-level data sources used in the analysis are Thrift Financial Reports
(TFRs) filed by each thrift with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). 16 TRFs are
analogous to the Consolidated Reports of Condition (Call Reports) filed by commer-
cial banks and include similar information from the bank balance sheet and income
statement. The TFR data were obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC).17 Although the TFRs are available at the quarterly frequency—due
16. After the passage of FIRREA in 1989, thrifts became subject to regulation by the OTS. The
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 eliminated this agency and placed thrift supervision under the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
17. The FDIC normalizes Call Reports and TFRs for use in their Statistics on Depository Insti-
tutions (SDI) system. This system provides a uniform schema that—for the most part—eliminates
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to limitations of the HMDA data described later in this section—most of the analysis
is at the bank-year level.
Over the inter-crisis period, important changes were afoot in the regulatory do-
main. In 1994, the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
(IBBEA) repealed provisions in the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) of 1956
that prevented bank mergers across state lines while in 1999, the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act preventing business
combinations between banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. As significant
as these changes were, they had limited direct effects on thrifts. Federally-chartered
thrifts had long enjoyed broad branching powers including the ability to open de
novo branches in any state. Thus, the effect of IBBEA was primarily to alter thrifts’
competitive environment. Commercial banks taking advantage of the new provisions
could now more easily merge to compete with thrifts at the national level. The major
effect of GLBA on thrifts was to close the “unitary thrift loophole” that had allowed
non-banking firms to purchase unitary thrift holding companies.18 This had the ef-
fect of reducing the value of the thrift charter as it no longer provided a means to
circumvent a key provision of the BHCA.
The lifting of branching restrictions led to a wave of consolidation throughout the
banking industry. Coming out of the S&L crisis, thrift numbers were at historic lows,
with only 1,953 thrifts operating (compared to 3,993 in 1980). These numbers would
soon seem large: by 2006:IV, only 817 thrifts remained. Over the same period assets
in the thrift sector grew from $850 billion to $1.5 trillion. Figure 2.1 plots these
trends.
Despite these changes, thrifts by and large continued to focus on mortgage lending.
By the end of the sample period, thrifts’ holdings of C&I loans did see a large (three-
differences resulting from heterogeneity in reporting requirements. Throughout, I use the normalized
SDI data for the analysis to avoid inconsistencies in the field definitions. This data is available from
the FDIC website at http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi
18. The BHCA prevented most business combinations between banks and commercial firms.
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fold) increase and came to make up some 4% of assets. However, this was still
considerably below QTL limits. Use of uninsured deposits also experienced significant
growth: they came to represent between 11%–13% of thrift assets. The pattern
is consistent with information frictions inhibiting small banks’ access to uninsured
funding.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Reports
A key feature of my analysis is the use of loan-level data. I use this data to
control for the effects of credit demand and to measure banks’ risk-taking. The
source of this data is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Originally enacted
in 1975, HMDA directed bank regulators to collect data on banks’ mortgage lending
activities to provide a picture of geographic and demographic trends in mortgage
lending.19 With the passage of FIRREA (in 1989) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA in 1991), the scope of HMDA was expanded
and a data collection standard was introduced that continues largely unchanged to
the present day.
Starting in 1991, HMDA required nearly all depository institutions and sub-
sidiaries as well as non-depository mortgage lenders to report loan-level data on all
home mortgage loan applications received along with details on their disposition.20
These loan-level reports are know as Loan Application Registers (LARs).21 Each
originator’s LAR contains one record for each residential mortgage loan issued, pur-
chased, or applied for in a given year. Each record contains information on the
loan amount, the borrower’s race and income, the location of the property (state,
19. Motivations include monitoring compliance with laws designed to prevent racial and gender
discrimination and measuring the efficacy of laws aimed at encouraging investment in disadvantaged
communities.
20. Depository institutions are required to file HMDA reports if they have more than approximately
$30 million in assets (in year 2000 dollars) and have a branch office located in a metropolitan
statistical area (MSA): very small banks operating exclusively in rural areas are exempt.
21. HMDA data are available for from the FFIEC web site, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/.
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county, census tract, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)), the property type (single
or multi-family), loan purpose (purchase, improvement, or refinance), the owner oc-
cupancy status, the loan type (conventional, FHA, or VA), the loan purchaser (bank,
affiliate, GSE, or other party), whether the loan was approved—alternatively the
reason for denial, and—if approved—whether the loan was accepted by the borrower.
As far as publicly accessible U.S. regulatory bank filings go, the data provided
in the LARs are unusually detailed; however, there are several limitations. Particu-
larly unfortunate omissions include important information on the loan terms (fixed
vs. adjustable, maturity, and pricing) as well as information about the borrowers’
credit history (i.e. credit scores).22 In addition, the data released to the public does
not contain specific information about timing—the data is at an annual granular-
ity.23 That said, the data does provide an unusually comprehensive picture of credit
conditions for an important sector covering an extended period of time.
The HMDA LARs from 1991–2006 contain nearly 400 million loan-level observa-
tions. Preliminary processing of the HMDA data involves fix-ups in the reporting
entity identifiers,24 normalization of MSA identifiers, elimination of entries contain-
ing reporting errors.25 and the elimination of entries pertaining to loans that were
purchased (rather than applied for). This eliminates approximately one quarter of
the observations.
In my analysis, I use the HMDA data in three ways. First, I use data on loan
applications to construct measures of the demand for bank credit—credit provided
22. Starting with 2002, pricing for certain high-priced loans is reported.
23. Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007) provide a thorough discussion of the limitations.
24. These can be the result of a changes in the reporting entity’s charter (e.g. a thrift that
becomes a bank), or continued (individual) reporting by entities that have been acquired. These
discrepancies are resolved so as to maintain consistency with bank regulatory filings (i.e. the TFRs
and Call Reports).
25. Many of these appear to be the result of what amounts to an incorrect placement of the decimal
point, others are likely the result of data-entry errors. To deal with these, I eliminate all observations
flagged (by the collecting agency) as having “edit errors” and those where the borrower’s income or
loan amount are in the top 1% of the respective distribution (in a given MSA-year). I also eliminate
records where the geographic information is missing.
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through the banks’ own balance sheets for each bank-year. Second, I use the dispo-
sition of loan applications to estimate banks’ underwriting standards. Third, I use
the geographical information about a bank’s approved loans to construct a measure
of its exposure to local economic risks. In each case, I am interested in loans destined
for the originating bank’s balance sheet, and consequently I eliminate OTD loans (all
loans originated by non-banks as well as bank-originated OTD loans). Eliminating
these loans leaves approximately fifty million direct applications for bank credit at
from over ten thousand distinct banks. These origination volumes are summarized
in Figure 2.2, which shows that thrifts were the primary source of bank credit at
the start of my sample. However, since the mid 1990s commercial banks’ participa-
tion has significantly increased, accounting for approximately 67% of the application
volume at the end of the sample period.
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Figure 2.1: Thrifts: numbers and total assets























































Figure 2.2: Applications for bank credit at thrifts and commercial banks
Figure 2.2 plots the dollar amount of applications for residential mortgage loans at thrifts
and commercial banks. The totals are computed from loan-level HMDA data. Loans sold




Monetary Policy and the Supply of Bank Credit
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study how monetary policy and financial frictions in the banking
sector interact to affect the supply of bank credit and to create a monetary policy
transmission channel operating through the banking system. Interest in the role
of banks in the transmission of monetary policy stems from shortcomings in the
standard, neoclassical interest rate channel (also known as the “money channel”).
Banks play no special role in the interest rate channel: monetary policy affects the
return on risk-free assets, altering the discount rate used in the calculation of the cost
of capital. Changes to the cost of capital in turn affect the level of investment.
The interest rate channel is found lacking due to the low observed elasticities of
investment (Chirinko (1993)). This has led some (notably, Bernanke and Gertler
(1995)) to emphasize the importance of credit channels of monetary policy transmis-
sion. In these channels, financial frictions take center stage. In particular, financial
frictions limiting banks’ ability to obtain deposit funding gives rise to a bank lending
channel of monetary policy transmission. It is this mechanism that is the focus of
this chapter.
The original conception of the bank lending channel is due to Bernanke and Blinder
(1988). There, it is the interaction of monetary policy and banks’ reserve requirements
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that causes shifts in banks’ loan supply. The monetary authorities affect the quantity
of reserves in the banking system through open market operations; because banks
are required to hold reserves against deposits, this affects the quantity of deposits
in the banking system. Changes in the quantity of deposits are accompanied by a
corresponding changes in bank lending as loans are financed through deposits.
Early evidence for the bank lending channel was provided by Bernanke and Blin-
der (1992), who used aggregate VAR evidence to make the case that shocks to the
Federal Funds rate produced responses in bank deposits, loans, and security holdings
consistent with the bank lending channel. That is, positive innovations in the Fed
Funds rate (a tightening) are followed by permanent reductions to bank deposits with
bank loans declining some six months after the shock.
This aggregate pattern is suggestive, but admits alternative explanations and the
proposed bank lending channel mechanism has been the subject of criticism. Romer
and Romer (1990) point out that in the modern banking system, reserves are not the
constraint they may have once been: it is only transaction deposits that are subject
to significant reserve requirements, and banks can easily overcome any shortage of
reserves by issuing liabilities not subject to reserve requirements (e.g. certificates of
deposit). If a large segment of bank liabilities are not subject to reserve requirements,
then the quantity of reserves is irrelevant to the supply of bank credit.
In response to this critique, the bank lending channel was reframed in a cross-
sectional context. Stein (1998) argues that banks do not have equal access to all
forms of liabilities: banks with high information frictions have a harder time raising
uninsured funding. Because liabilities not subject to reserve requirements are more
likely to be uninsured, banks with low information frictions may be relatively unaf-
fected by the bank lending channel, however, those with high information frictions
(i.e. banks dependent on insured deposits) would continue to be affected. This formu-
lation has the additional benefit of providing a more plausible identification strategy
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based on micro-level bank panel data. Specifically, if one assumes that banks with
low information frictions face borrowers similar to those of banks with high informa-
tion frictions, then supply effects can be identified through cross-sectional variation
in banks’ lending growth following monetary policy shocks.
This cross-sectional identification strategy was the basis for subsequent empirical
work on the bank lending channel, starting with Anil K. Kashyap and Stein (1995) and
Anil K Kashyap and Stein (2000). Using data on commercial bank lending covering
a period beginning in the 1970s and ending in the early 1990s, Kashyap and Stein
find that loan growth at small banks is more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than
lending at large banks, and attribute the difference to bank lending channel effects.
Furthermore, they find that balance sheet strength (i.e. large holdings of marketable
securities) insulates smaller banks from the effects of the policy shocks; they argue
that this is consistent with security holdings being used as “buffer-stocks” that absorb
deposit outflows.
Using a similar approach and data, Ashcraft (2006) find that banks affiliated with
a multi-bank holding companies are less responsive to monetary policy shocks. This
is broadly consistent with the bank lending channel mechanism: banks that are not
part of banking group are likely to have limited access to uninsured funding and hence
more dependent on reservable insured deposits.
Kishan and Opiela (2006) extend the bank lending channel analysis to incorporate
bank capital effects and find evidence of lending response that is consistent with a
bank lending channel mechanism, albeit one that interacts with a banks’ capital posi-
tion. Specifically, they find that small banks with low capital reduce loan supply more
than large banks in contractions (per the bank lending channel), but do not increase
loan supply more than large banks in expansions. This asymmetry is attributed to
bank capital acting as the binding constraint for banks with low capital .
While studies using U.S. commercial bank data from the 1970s through early 1990s
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have tended to support the bank lending view, the evidence is not conclusive. One
problem is the identification strategy. A key assumption in these analyses is that the
sensitivity of loan demand to monetary policy is constant across various bank cate-
gories (i.e. size, capitalization, or affiliation). This allows inter-group differences in
banks’ lending response to be attributed to changes in banks loan supply rather than
to changes in borrowers’ demand for loans. However, it is not clear that this assump-
tion is warranted. Different types of banks have different types of borrowers: smaller
banks and banks that are not part of larger bank groups cater to smaller borrowers
Keeton (1995). Consequently, differences in the semi-elasticities of loan growth across
bank categories may simply reflect differences in borrowers’ semi-elasticities of loan
demand. This problem is especially acute in the context of commercial and industrial
loans which are the main focus of the earlier studies.1
A second issue with the bank lending channel evidence is the data on which it is
based. U.S. studies of the bank lending channel rely heavily on data from the 1970s
and 1980s. This period is problematic in that it includes several years of uncon-
ventional monetary policy (the Volcker explicit quantity-targeting regime between
1979–1982), as well as a decade during which reserve quantities potentially played
some role in Fed policy (1982–1992). Moreover, the regulatory regime during much of
this period was either dysfunction or undergoing major change. The dysfunction took
the form of recurring periods of disintermediation resulting from Regulation Q price
controls on interest rates interacting with the high inflation of the 1970s. The regula-
tory changes—the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA), and the associated interest
ceiling phase-outs—were a response to this dysfunction. Implementation of the MCA
involved numerous changes to the monetary mechanism over an extended period: in
the 1973–1992 period, there were forty-five changes to banks’ reserve requirements,
1. While J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of Ann Arbor may face similar borrowers (and demand)
for home and consumer loans, they are likely to have very dissimilar commercial customers.
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while in the 1993–2006 period, there was only one.2
Empirical tests of credit channels are complicated by changes to monetary ar-
rangements, the complexity of the banking sector, as well as difficulties in observing
the demand for credit. Consequently, the existence and nature of the underlying
mechanism remain open questions.
To shed light on these questions, I investigate the bank lending channel mechanism
in the context of U.S. thrifts in the years preceding the Sub-prime Crisis. My empirical
strategy follows the approach of previous micro-data studies in which cross-section
differences in banks’ monetary policy response are used to identify credit supply
shifts. However, I augment this approach with potentially critical—but generally
unobserved—controls for credit demand. I construct these bank-level controls from
loan-level data on banks’ loan application activity as reported in Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) filings.
Moreover, by focusing on thrifts, I get a cleaner picture of banks’ response. Be-
cause thrifts have limited opportunity to diversify into non-housing related assets
and have limited off-balance sheet exposures, there is far less scope for unobserved
variable bias in my analysis. Changes in thrifts’ residential mortgage loan lending are
unlikely to be confounded by changes to portfolio preferences.
Finally, by considering the pre-crisis period, I avoid the regulatory instability that
was common to the earlier studies. And—perhaps more importantly—by focusing on
a period with “modern” regulatory arrangements, my analysis has more relevance to
the future conduct of policy.
The results from my analysis of thrifts’ mortgage lending over the pre-crisis period
is inconsistent with traditional formulations of the bank lending channel. Following
2. The history of changes to reserve requirements is summarized in Federal Reserve Statistical
Release H.3. In tallying the changes for the two periods, I ignore annual changes resulting from
indexing used in the calculation of the upper bound of the MCA’s “low-reserve tranche”—the trans-
action deposits subject to reduced reserve requirements. The one change to reserve requirements in
the later period was the 1998 change from contemporaneous to lagged reserve accounting.
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earlier studies, I use bank size as a proxy for information frictions, with small banks are
assumed to be afflicted with more severe information frictions. However, I find that
it is big banks’ credit supply that is more affected by monetary policy. This finding
suggests that—as originally argued in Romer and Romer (1990) (and more recently
in Bernanke (2007))—the emphasis on reserves-based mechanisms in the bank lend-
ing channel is misplaced. My findings suggest that another—quite different—supply
mechanism is at work.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I describe the
empirical strategy and data. In Section 3.3, I present my results. The final section
concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Key to understanding the mechanisms underlying the bank lending channel is the
questions of how a bank’s information frictions and regulatory constraints interact
with monetary policy. The common premise of bank lending channel theories is that
these interactions affect banks’ ability to supply credit, and that these changes in
supply have important macro-economic consequences. Distinguishing shifts in banks’
credit supply from traditional interest rate channel effects is problematic in aggregate
data, as both effects lead to similar consequences. Consequently, to identify the
specific transmission mechanism, one must turn to micro-data.
The standard micro-data identification strategy used in the bank lending channel
literature amounts to generalized difference-in-difference: cross-sectional differences
in banks’ loan growth following a monetary policy shock are attributed to shifts in
banks’ loan supply. This strategy rests on a critical identifying assumption: the semi-
elasticity of bank customers’ loan demand is homogeneous across banks. Failing this
assumption, cross-sectional differences in banks’ loan growth may be due to different
types of banks having different types of customers who respond differently to changes
32
in interest rates. In my analysis, I follow the standard micro-data identification
strategy; however, I augment it with explicit controls for banks’ loan demand. I
construct these controls from loan-level data on banks’ loan applications, thus better
isolating supply shifts.
Following earlier studies, the baseline regression specification in my analysis is a
reduced-form dynamic panel model in growth rates of the following form:















where i and t index over banks and time respectively, Dit is an indicator variable
indicating the bank’s membership in some category based on a cross-sectional bank
characteristic (e.g. “big bank”). The change in the policy rate (here, the Fed Funds
rate), ∆FFt, serves as the (generalized) indicator for the policy shock.
3 The vec-
tor of controls, Xjt, includes macroeconomic and financial variables that may be
confound the monetary policy shock; these may include: GDP growth, inflation,
long-term rates, or yield spreads. Other variables such as bank balance sheet char-
acteristics, time trends, year fixed effect, and explicit demand controls may also be
included. These controls are interacted with the category dummies to allow for arbi-
trary category-level differences in the coefficients. The auto-regressive lag structure
allows for one year (or four quarters) of lags, and is intended to represent limitations
in banks’ ability to quickly adjust the growth in lending (e.g. it takes time to build
branches, hire loan officers, etc.) which leads to auto-regressive dynamics.
In the baseline specification, I maintain the assumption of no bank fixed effects.
Doing so avoids the inconsistency of OLS in dynamic fixed effect models (see Nickell
3. It is “generalized” in the sense of being a continuous variable. In a conventional difference-in-
difference, this would be the binary “pre/post” indicator variable.
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(1981)). In robustness checks, I consider specifications with fixed effects but without
dynamics as well ones with both dynamics and fixed effects. I estimate the dynamic
fixed effect models using OLS.
In all specifications, the coefficients of interest are on the category–dummy inter-
actions, i.e. the γτ s. This is interpreted as the incremental loan growth response to
a 100bp shock in the Fed Funds rate attributable to the banks’ membership in some
cross-sectional category (e.g. “big bank”).
The empirical strategy is best illustrated with tests of the traditional bank lend-
ing channel hypothesis: that banks with high information frictions—such as small











In terms of the standard regression specification, if Dit is defined such that it indicates
membership in the “big bank” category, then the hypothesis is
∑
γτ > 0. That is,
big banks’ loan growth response to a positive monetary policy shock is higher, i.e. it
is less negative than the response of small banks.
Critical to the above is the previously alluded to identification assumption that
the estimated differences are not a result of cross-sectional differences in the monetary
policy sensitivity of bank borrowers’ credit demand. Loose monetary policy makes
more projects viable (the traditional interest rate channel of monetary policy) and
strengthens borrower’s balance sheets (the balance-sheet channel of Bernanke and
Gertler (1995)); both of these factors can increase the effective demand for credit. If
demand sensitivities of borrowers differ across banks in the different categories, then
the strategy’s ability to identify supply effects is undermined. The typical approach is
to assume that demand sensitivities are orthogonal to bank characteristics (or argue
that the bias is an unfavorable direction). Thus, if small banks reduce lending more in
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response to monetary tightening, this is attributed to small banks’ inability to supply
credit, rather than to small banks’ borrowers reducing their demand for credit.
The validity of this assumption in the context of commercial banks’ commercial
and industrial (C & I) lending is questionable. Big banks’ commercial borrowers are
likely to be quite different from commercial borrowers at small banks. In particular,
since small banks tend to cater to small firms, there are significant differences between
small and large bank borrowers’ ability to access alternative funding sources, their
collateral, and their potential investment projects. As C & I lending at commercial
banks is the most frequent focus of bank lending channel studies, this raises some
questions as to the interpretation of the prior findings.4
As my analysis focuses on thrifts’ mortgage lending, it much less susceptible to
this critique. Thrifts’ borrowers are relatively homogeneous—the majority are indi-
viduals financing their home. However, even in simple and undiversified thrifts, the
homogeneous demand sensitivity cannot be taken for granted. A thrift’s product of-
ferings (e.g. a specialization in ARM products) can have important implications on its
credit demand. For mortgage borrowers, interest rates affect not only the overall de-
mand for credit, but also the relative attractiveness of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate
products. When long-term rates are high, borrowers prefer adjustable-rate loans.5
This can lead to situations where monetary tightenings increase demand for bank
credit (i.e. loans funded through bank balance sheets) due to borrowers’ substituting
away from fixed-rate products (which are more likely to be funded through market
sources) into adjustable-rate products (which are more likely to be funded through
4. Another issue with commercial lending is cross-sectional variability in the use of loan commit-
ments (see for example, Duca and Vanhoose (1990)).
5. This idea is developed formally in Koijen, Hemert, and Nieuwerburgh (2009), who attribute
the time-series variation in borrowers’ preferences to time-series variation in the bond premium.
They propose that borrowers employ a simple “rule of thumb” to estimate the bond premium
using the difference between the long rate and the average of recent short rates. Under the rule of
thumb, higher long-term rates lead to higher estimates of the bond premium, resulting in borrowers’
substitution away from fixed-rate loans into adjustable-rate loans.
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banks’ balance sheets).6 This highlights the importance of a bank’s product mix in
its lending response and can undermines homogeneous demand assumptions even in
the most simple settings.
To address problems, I construct bank-level demand controls using loan-level
HMDA data. For each bank-year, I sum the dollar amount of all applications not
resulting in a securitized origination, to obtain measure of demand for bank-supplied
credit, Appsit. To measure credit demand growth, I use the difference in logs:
∆log(Appsit).
This measure is not without problems. A bank’s applications may be endogenous
to its ability to supply credit: banks that are financially constrained may be less
inclined to solicit business (e.g. through advertising expenditures) and in this way,
supply constraints can cause a reduction in applications. To deal with this potential
endogeneity, I instrument each bank’s loan demand using the local demand in the
areas where each bank lends. For each bank-year, I tally the dollar amount of the
bank’s loan applications by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). From these bank-
year-MSA totals, I calculate a MSA-weight vector for each bank-year (i.e. the fraction
of each bank’s loan applications originating in each MSA). Next, for each MSA-year,
I calculate the growth in total application activity. I then weight these MSA-year
growth rates by each bank’s MSA-weight vector from the previous year, to obtain an
instrument for banks’ demand growth, LocalAppGrowthit.
I estimate the regression using several estimation methods, including pooled OLS,
fixed effects, and IV. Most of the analysis uses a bank-year panel. In addition to
data limitations (the HMDA data is annual) there are two reasons for performing
the analysis at the annual frequency. First, mortgage lending is seasonal and the
degree of this seasonality varies from bank to bank and from region to region. This
heterogeneity in seasonality implies that a simple dynamic panel model estimated at
6. This presumes that monetary policy affects long-term rates. There is some debate on the extent
of this effect; see Berument and Froyen (2009) for a survey and some evidence.
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higher frequencies is likely to be mis-specified. Second, monetary policy follows a
low-frequency process (see Figure 3.2): not much is lost by performing the analysis
at an annual frequency. Moreover, higher-frequency estimates would be subject to
collinearity problems.
Data
The primary data source for this analysis is the FDIC SDI database contain-
ing a panel of thrift balance sheets and income statements obtained from thrifts’
regulatory filings and covering the inter-crisis period (i.e. 1992–2006). A general
description of this data set can is found in Section 2.2. I augment this panel with
my derived measures of loan demand (Appsit, and LocalAppGrowthit) constructed
from the HMDA data. Over the sample period, U.S. banking industry underwent
considerable consolidation. One issue with consolidation is that observed growth in a
bank’s lending—the dependent variable—may reflect acquisitions rather than growth.
To avoid this, I eliminate bank-years where the bank was involved in merger activity
(as either an acquirer or a target).7
In addition to this bank-quarter panel, my analysis makes use of macro-level data
on monetary policy stance. I measure monetary policy stance with the change in
the average annual effective Fed Funds rate, ∆FFt (so that ∆FFt > 0 corresponds
to a monetary contraction). Figure 3.2 plots the average annual Fed Funds rate
together with the corresponding monthly series for my sample period. In terms of
measuring monetary policy stance, the sample period has two attractive features: it
was characterized by stable monetary arrangements and—as is clear from Figure 3.2—
monetary policy evolved slowly and hence little is lost from conducting the analysis
at the annual frequency.
Ambiguity about the implementation of monetary policy had made the measure-
7. Data on merger activity is obtained from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Coun-
cil’s (FFIEC’s) National Information Center web site, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
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ment of monetary policy stance a non-trivial problem in earlier periods. In addition
to changes in the Fed Funds rate, various—more elaborate—measures were proposed
that attempted to overcome this ambiguity. Examples include: a subjective index
constructed from readings of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) documents
(Boschen and Mills (1995)), the quantity of non-borrowed reserves (Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992)), and a measure based on a structural model of the market for
bank reserves (Bernanke and Mihov (1998)). In the 1992–2006 period, there was little
ambiguity about how monetary policy was conducted: it was affected through changes
to the Fed Funds rate. Therefore, I do not consider these alternative measures.8
As the analysis focuses on cross-sectional differences in banks’ response to mone-
tary policy shocks across bank size categories, it is necessary to define the categories.
I define three: Smallt, Mediumt, and Bigt. These are based on size cut-offs taken
to be at the 75th and 95th percentile of each year’s thrift size distribution. The cut-
offs are somewhat arbitrary; they were chosen to ensure that each category contains
a non-trivial number of banks. At the start of the period, this implies 1464 small
banks, 391 medium banks, and 98 big banks, representing 15%, 26%, and 59% of
the in-sample banks’ total assets. The balance sheet composition of banks in each of
these categories at the start and end of the sample period are shown in Tables 3.1
and 3.2, respectively.
At the start of my sample (1992:IV), 1,953 thrifts were operating. Their size dis-
tribution was similar to that of contemporary commercial banks. Thrifts tended to
8. The use of measures based on monetary aggregates (such as M2, deposits, etc) waned in the
1990s due to problems reconciling such measures with certain stylized facts: the absence of Granger-
causality from monetary aggregates to output in the presence of interest rates (described in Litterman
and Weiss (1985) and a similar absence of Granger-causality from monetary aggregates to short term
interest rates (described in Leeper and Gordon (1992)). This led Bernanke and Blinder (1992) to
argue that measurements of monetary policy should be based on innovations in the interest rate.
Monetary policy—so measured—had the expected effects on output. A more compelling rationale
was provided in Bernanke and Mihov (1998) who found that in the latter half of the 20thcentury, the
Federal Reserve had targeted interest rates and largely accommodated fluctuations in the demand
for reserves (as argued earlier in Tobin (1970)). The major exception to this appears to be the
1979–1982 period of explicit reserve-quantity-targeting.
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be bigger than commercial banks, but the very biggest commercial banks (i.e. those
the top 2%) were bigger than the biggest thrifts. Commercial and industrial (C&I)
lending at thrifts was very limited: C&I loans represented only 1% of total assets—
considerably below the regulatory limits. One might imagine that thrifts did not
generally possess the “technology” for making C&I loans, or that the C&I lending
technology was not efficient at the smaller scale implied by QTL restrictions. The
pattern in thrifts’ cash holdings—smaller thrifts held more cash—is consistent with
intuition: smaller thrifts should have more limited access to external funding and
should therefore hold more cash as a liquidity buffer. One might also expect this
pattern to hold in the holdings of securities, but it does not. Here the relationship
is non-monotonic, with the the smallest (below 75th percentile) and biggest thrifts’
(above 95th percentile) holdings of securities making up 21% and 25% of assets re-
spectively, while for medium-sized thrifts, security holdings made up 28% of assets.
In terms of liabilities, small thrifts were much more dependent on insured deposits
than the larger thrifts. In 1992:IV, 85% of small thrifts’ assets were funded through
insured deposits. For medium and big thrifts, insured deposits made up 80% and 71%
of assets respectively. This difference was not due to uninsured deposits: in all size
categories thrifts made hardly any use of uninsured deposits (they accounted for only
2.6% to 3.8% of thrifts’ assets). Most of the difference in funding was due to larger
thrifts’ extensive use of FHLB advances and interbank borrowings (Fed Funds).
3.3 Results
I first analyze the role information frictions play in the impact of monetary policy
shocks on loan growth (Table 3.3). Then, I extend this analysis to include the effects
of bank capital (Table 3.4).
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Information Frictions
Table 3.3 reports the results from the analysis of the impact of monetary policy on
loan growth across bank-size categories. Each column corresponds to a different set
of controls or an alternate estimation method. In each case, the dependent variable is
the change in the log of the book value of residential mortgage loans, ∆log(Lit). The
regression specification is described in the previous section (Equation 3.1). Following
Anil K Kashyap and Stein (2000), I include GDP growth, a linear time trend, and
Federal Reserve Board district dummies, as well as balance sheet liquidity (i.e. the
ratio of cash and securities to assets), Bit−1, and its interactions with the the mone-
tary policy indicator, GDP growth, and the linear time trend. Balance sheet liquidity
is included because buffer stocks of cash and securities can insulate banks from the
impact of contractionary shocks (securities can be sold to finance loan growth). In ad-
dition to these standard covariates, I also include changes in bank-level loan demand,
∆Appsit, (potentially instrument with LocalAppGrowthit as well as changes to the
prevailing thirty year conventional mortgage rate, ∆MTGt. The former is intended
to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ demand sensitivities. The latter
is an important factor in the aggregate level of demand for bank credit.9 I report the
estimates from regressions with only contemporaneous effects—inclusion of lags does
not materially alter the results. All reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity
consistent and clustered by bank and all tests are two-sided.10
According to the traditional bank lending channel hypothesis, small banks—which
are said to suffer from high information frictions—should be more responsive to mon-
etary policy shocks. Under all specifications, I find no evidence for increased mone-
9. Note that increases in mortgage rates can increase demand for bank-supplied mortgage credit.
See footnote 5.
10. For robustness, I compute standard errors clustered at the category-year level allowing for
arbitrary cross-sectional covariance structure within each category-year (but not for within-bank
correlation). Standard error estimates obtained under this alternative clustering scheme do not
have a qualitative effect on the interpretation of my results; for brevity, I do not separately report
them.
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tary policy sensitivity at smaller banks. Tightenings (∆FFt > 0) do not reduce small
banks’ credit supply (the coefficient estimates on ∆FF are not negative). Conversely,
the hypothesis that large banks are less responsive (vis-á-vis small banks) is rejected:
big banks are considerably more responsive (the coefficients on ∆FF ×Big are neg-
ative). Following a 100bp contractionary shock to the Fed Funds rate, big banks’
lending is estimated to fall by 3.1%–5.7%, with the inclusion of bank-level demand
controls leading to larger estimates.
Two additional predictions of the traditional bank lending channel relate to bal-
ance sheet liquidity, Bit. First, for small banks, balance sheet liquidity should mitigate






where ∂Lit/∂FFt|i∈Small < 0. Liquid assets can act as a “buffer stock” which can be
drawn down when policy is tight. Second, for big banks, low information frictions











The first prediction (i.e. that the estimates of the coefficients on ∆FFt × Bit−1
are positive) finds no support (the estimates are either negative or statistically in-
significant). The second prediction (i.e. that the estimates of the coefficients on
∆FFt × Bit−1 × Bigit are positive) is rejected: it is at big banks that balance sheet
liquidity appears to mitigate the effects of policy. For a big bank with 10% in liquid
assets, a 100bp increase to the policy rate is associated with a 4.0% reduction in loan
growth; for a big bank with 20% in liquid assets, the same 100bp shock is associated
with a 2.3% reduction (based on estimates from specification (6)). Thus, for a typical
big bank in my sample, a doubling of liquid asset holdings corresponds roughly to
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halving the monetary policy sensitivity. These large differences (the average annual
loan growth over my sample period is approximately 5%) are statistically significant
in all the specifications, and are larger in the specifications that include bank-level
demand controls.
These results do run counter to some earlier studies of the bank lending channel in
the U.S. commercial lending context (Anil K. Kashyap and Stein (1995) and (2000)).
In addition to differences in the type of lending, sample period, and the availability of
demand controls, there is the potential that methodological differences (such as the
annual frequency) play a role. As a robustness check, I reproduce the methodology
of Anil K Kashyap and Stein (2000) and apply their “one-step” estimation to data
on quarterly mortgage lending for banks in my sample. They focus on the effects
of liquidity (i.e. its mitigating effect), and in Table 3.5 I report the estimates of
these effects. They paint a similar picture: small banks’ balance sheet liquidity does
not mitigate the impact of monetary policy (line 1); the mitigating effect increases
with size category (lines 2 and 3): balance sheet liquidity mitigates the impact of
monetary policy at the medium and large banks (statistical significance obtains only
for the medium-sized banks).
Capital Constraints
One issue that I have ignored so far is bank capital. Capital constraints may play
an important role in banks’ response to monetary policy shocks, leading to a potential
bank capital channel of monetary policy transmission (Peek and Rosengren (1995)):
following an expansionary shock, banks subject to binding capital constraints may
not be able to expand lending because regulatory capital constraints prevent the
usual bank lending channel from operating. Thus, in the short-term, banks with
low capital will be less affected by monetary policy shocks (at least by expansionary
shocks). However, over time, loose policy improves bank balance sheets and net
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interest margins, thereby relaxing the capital constraint (Van den Heuvel (2002)).
This second effect can lead to the opposite effect in the medium-term.
Table 3.4 shows the effect of capital and banks’ monetary policy sensitivity. I sort
banks on leverage ratio to form two sub-samples. The first includes the less-capitalized
banks (those below the 50thpercentile), and the second the rest. I fit the main loan
growth regression (specification (6) in Table 3.3) on each of the two sub-samples.
The heightened sensitivity of the larger banks to monetary policy shocks is present
(and slightly stronger) in the less-capitalized sub-sample: among better-capitalized
banks, cross-sectional differences in the monetary policy response are absent. This
casts doubt on the notion that capital constraints suppress the traditional bank lend-
ing channel in the short-term. However, it may be that relatively under-capitalized
banks are more exposed to the bank lending channel due to greater difficulties finding
funding in the wholesale markets.
3.4 Discussion
Nothing in my results suggests that the traditional bank lending channel mecha-
nism is at work. Monetary policy does not appear to constrain small banks through
its effects on reserves: it is big banks that appear more responsive to policy. More-
over, this differential in the response appears to originate at the less-capitalized banks.
This is perhaps not too surprising to critics of the bank lending channel (e.g. Romer
and Romer (1990)) who have long maintained that in the modern financial system
the reserve constraints at the heart of the bank lending channel are not likely to bind
due to the wide variety of funding sources not subject to reserve requirements.
More recently, a similar point was made by Bernanke (2007), who suggested that
the reserve-driven quantity effects of monetary policy might be “quantitatively unim-
portant”, and that the bank lending channel should be reinterpreted in other terms.
However, without the rigid structure of the conventional (reserve-based) interpreta-
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tion, alternative cross-sectional predictions become possible: a reinterpreted bank
lending channel can imply that small banks should in fact be less sensitive to mone-
tary policy then big banks; my findings could then be construed as providing support
for such reformulations.
One example of such a reformulation is found in the model of Disyatat (2011). In
his model, monetary policy affects banks’ lending supply through its effect on banks’
health: increases to the policy rate reduce the value of bank assets, bank health
suffers, which leads to higher equilibrium borrowing costs (i.e. an increase to the
external finance premium), which reduces the supply of bank lending. Although not
explicitly modeled, banks reliant on insured deposits—i.e. small, under-capitalized
banks—would be insensitive to monetary policy: changes in these banks’ condition
is not reflected in their cost of (insured) funding. Similarly, such effects should be
less of a factor at banks that are well-capitalized; this is broadly consistent with my
findings.11
Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2012) obtained similar results in an aggre-
gate VAR study of commercial banks’ lending from roughly the same period (1990–
2007). They found that bank loans at small banks increase following a contractionary
shock—lending at big and medium banks declines following the shock. They interpret
this as evidence against the traditional formulations of the bank lending channel.
An alternative possibility is that the big banks’ more pronounced quantity re-
sponse is due to credit rationing. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) develop a “generalized
loanable funds” theory where banks’ credit supply is the solution to an optimization
problem in which the additional returns from credit expansion are counter-balanced
by an increasing likelihood of (inefficient) liquidation. In their model, there are no
finance premia or borrowing constraints—banks may borrow as much as they wish
at a rate dictated by policy. However, banks face adverse selection problems on the
11. A similar mechanism is proposed in Black, Hancock, and Passmore (2007); there, stable core
deposits mitigate the effects of monetary policy at traditional banks.
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asset side (i.e. from their borrowers). If the adverse selection problem is not too
severe then changes to the policy rate affect the optimum level of lending—generally,
higher rates lead to less lending. However, if the adverse selection problem is severe,
small changes to the policy rate will not effect the quantity of credit supplied. Intu-
itively, for a bank with severe adverse selection problems, the equilibrium lending rate
is constrained by adverse selection concerns: small changes to the bank’s borrowing
costs do not affect the lending rate and credit supply is unchanged (i.e. the bank is at
a “kink”). Conversely, if the adverse selection problem is not too severe, the bank’s
borrowing costs can be passed on through the lending rate to the bank’s borrowers,
reducing the equilibrium quantity of credit in the process. Small banks—due to their
limited geographical diversification—may face more severe adverse selection problems
and operate at the kink. If this is the case, changes to monetary policy would have
less of an impact on the quantity of credit supplied by small banks. However, it is
not clear why such cross-sectional differences would arise only at the less-capitalized
banks; this feature of the data tends to favor a bank health interpretation of my
findings.
Limitations
With much of my analysis being done at the annual frequency, reverse causality is
a potential problem: the results I have reported may be due not to monetary policy’s
effects on banks’ lending, but due to the effects of banks’ lending on monetary pol-
icy. Lacking truly exogenous monetary policy shocks requires resorting to arguments
against such interpretation; here there are at least two.
First, there is considerable reason to doubt that lending activity in the mortgage
sector should have had a significant direct causal effect on monetary policy during
the period in question: sector-specific financial market conditions are not—or at least
were not—a major factor in the central bank’s policy rule: this has been affirmed in
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statements of the Federal Open Market Committee over this period.12 In terms of
indirect effects, the growth in mortgage lending certainly had an effect on residential
investment growth, which contributes to GDP growth, which affects the policy rate;
however, the inclusion of GDP growth in my regressions is sufficient to control for
indirect effects operating through the GDP channel.13
The second problem with the reverse causality interpretation is that it is not
does not offer a natural (or at least obvious) explanation for the observed cross-
sectional differences. For the reverse causality story to hold, cross-sectional differences
in mortgage loan growth must affect monetary policy through a distinct causal path.14
It is not clear why the central bank should lower the policy rate when large banks
expand mortgage lending more than small banks. Absent a plausible motivation for
such actions—or some unobserved third cause—the interpretation in which monetary
policy causes the cross-section differences in lending growth is the most compelling.
I find that—in thrifts—traditional bank lending channel mechanisms do not ap-
pear to be at work. An important question is whether these findings have more
general applicability. Traditional reserve-based explanations for the bank lending
channel rely on stylized models of banking that have more in common with thrifts
than with complex commercial banks—thus, if they are not applicable here, it is
unlikely that they should be applicable anywhere else.
Another potential problem relates to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances.
12. For example, in the June 29–30, 2005 minutes, with regard to monetary policy’s role in address-
ing “possible imbalances” in the housing market, the meeting participants stressed “the importance
of the pursuit of their core objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable economic growth.
To the extent that an asset price movement threatened the achievement of those objectives, it would
of course be taken into consideration in setting policy. However, given the unavoidable uncertainties
associated with judgments regarding the appropriate level of and likely future movements in asset
prices, a strategy of responding more directly to possible mis-pricing was seen as very unlikely to
contribute, on balance, to the achievement of the Committee’s objectives over time.”
13. I assume that there are no causal paths from mortgage loan growth to monetary policy that do
not operate via GDP growth or via changes in mortgage rates. Also, it is assumed that monetary
policy has no contemporaneous effect on GDP growth.
14. Distinct in the sense that the cross-sectional differences in loan growth affect policy directly,
or via some indirect causal path that does not include GDP growth or changes in mortgage rates,
which are included in my regressions.
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Historically, thrifts have belonged to the FHLB system which provides facilities sim-
ilar to the Fed discount window. Member banks are able to obtain advances against
suitable collateral (whole loans, mortgage-backed and other government securities)
not only to meet unforeseen liquidity needs, but also as a means of financing day-to-
day lending activity.15 An important feature of this facility is that it is not discrim-
inatory: the smallest community thrifts enjoy access similar to that of the largest
national lenders.16 This is in contrast to sources of wholesale funding such as the Fed
Funds market or large denomination (uninsured) CDs—the usage of which is heavily
skewed toward large institutions. Many thrifts make regular use of FHLB advances
as a source of wholesale funding, and this usage is not inconsequential: at the end of
my sample period FHLB advances totaled approximately $650 billion.17 The onset of
the crisis demonstrated the significance of the FHLB facility: advances approached
the $1 trillion mark in 2007. Thus, it may be that the mechanisms affecting thrifts’
supply of credit are heavily influenced by the existence of this facility.
I do not have an empirical refutation of this FHLB-based explanation. However,
since the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of
1989, FHLB membership has been open to commercial banks with at least 10% of as-
sets in mortgage products—a relatively low bar.18 In the ensuing years, membership
(and advances) to commercial banks have grown rapidly. Overwhelmingly, system
members have large amounts of uncommitted collateral and make use of FHLB ad-
15. FHLB advances do not have the “frown costs” of the discount window, they enjoy a “super-
lien” on bank assets (no default has never occurred), and are subsidized due to implicit government
guarantees on the FHLB system’s liabilities. Thrifts’ increasing use of these advances (see Tables 3.1
and 3.2), suggests that they represent an attractive funding source, although direct comparison of
FHLB borrowing costs to other sources of wholesale funding (or to the discount window) is somewhat
complicated as advances require a simultaneous purchase of FHLB equity shares (Ashcraft, Bech,
and Frame (2010) provide a discussion).
16. Subject to each Federal Home Loan Bank’s specific credit standards. Due to the collateralized
nature of the advances and FHLB’s “super-lien” alluded to in the previous footnote, there is little
incentive for extensive monitoring.
17. Data on aggregate FHLB usage is available through the FHLB’s Office of Finance. Each thrift’s
usage of FHLB facility is reported on the TFR.
18. At the start of my sample period, commercial banks’ real estate lending represented approxi-
mately 30% of commercial bank assets.
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vances to fund commercial loans.19 Thus, it is unlikely that FHLB advances set thrifts
apart.
Conclusion
Does monetary policy affect banks’ credit supply? Does tight money constrain
certain banks more than others? These questions are key to understanding the credit
channels of monetary policy transmission. Using bank-level and loan-level data on
U.S. mortgage lending, I am able to examine these questions in a setting where bank-
specific credit demand can be controlled. I find that policy has more pronounced
effects at large banks rather than at small banks, contrary to the predictions of tradi-
tional bank lending channel theory. My findings suggest that conceptions of the bank
lending channel of monetary policy transmission should not be taken for granted—I
find no evidence to suggest that conventional—reserve-based—mechanisms play a sig-
nificant role in banks’ supply of credit. However, my findings are consistent with bank
health playing a role in monetary transmission and suggests that monetary policy’s
effects on the markets for bank liabilities has potentially important consequences for
policy.
19. Legally, usage of FHLB advances is restricted to residential lending; the frangibility of money
makes this impossible to enforce (or even define). The empirical evidence suggests that banks use
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30−Year Conventional Mortgage Rate (%, right scale)
Figure 3.1: Mortgage rates and on-balance-sheet lending
Figure 3.1 plots the percentage of bank-originated mortgage loans funded through bank
balance sheets along with the average thirty-year conventional mortgage rate. The former
is calculated from banks’ loan-level HMDA filings which contain information on whether an
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Figure 3.2: The Fed Funds rate
Figure 3.2 plots the monthly Fed Funds rate, together with its annual average. The change
in annual average Fed Funds rate, ∆FFt, is the monetary policy indicator used throughout
the analysis.
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Midi 0 1 0
Largei 0 0 1
Number of thrifts 1464 391 98
Mean assets ($ million) 85 563 5196
Median assets ($ million) 69 456 2906
Percent of total thrift assets 15 26 60
Assets 100 100 100
Cash 8 5 2
Interest bearing 7 3 1
Securities 21 28 25
FedFunds lent 1 1 1
Loans 64 59 63
Real estate loans 49 42 45
Consumer loans 4 3 4
C&I loans 1 1 1
Other assets 5 7 9
Liabilities and equity 100 100 100
Deposits 88 84 75
Insured deposits 85 80 71
Core deposits 81 77 66
Brokered deposits 0 1 2
FedFunds borrowed 0 1 4
Subordinated debt 0 0 1
Other liabilities 4 8 15
FHLB advances 3 6 10
Equity 7 7 6
Table 3.1 shows the aggregate balance sheet composition of banks in each size category as of 1992:IV.
All balance sheet items are reported as a fraction of total assets. The size categories Smallt, Medt,
and Bigt are formed based on cutoffs at the 75
th and 95th percentile of the bank size distribution
at time t.
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Midi 0 1 0
Largei 0 0 1
Number of thrifts 612 164 41
Mean assets ($ million) 144 1167 28815
Median assets ($ million) 118 878 14292
Percent of total thrift assets 6 13 81
Assets 100 100 100
Cash 5 4 2
Interest bearing 4 2 0
Securities 17 17 16
FedFunds lent 1 1 2
Loans 71 72 72
Real estate loans 45 35 53
Consumer loans 3 5 6
C&I loans 3 4 4
Other assets 5 6 9
Liabilities and equity 100 100 100
Deposits 76 71 57
Insured deposits 65 57 44
Core deposits 54 46 35
Brokered deposits 2 5 8
FedFunds borrowed 1 2 5
Subordinated debt 0 0 1
Other liabilities 11 16 24
FHLB advances 10 14 17
Equity 12 11 13
Table 3.2 shows the aggregate balance sheet composition of banks in each size category as of 2006:IV.
All balance sheet items are reported as a fraction of total assets. The size categories Smallt, Medt,
and Bigt are formed based on cutoffs at the 75
th and 95th percentile of the bank size distribution
at time t.
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Table 3.3: Regressions of mortgage loan growth on monetary policy shocks
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV/FE
∆FFt 0.008 0.002 0.023 0.014 0.014
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003) (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
∆FFt ×Medit -0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
∆FFt ×Bigit -0.046 -0.049 -0.054 -0.060 -0.060 -0.057
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗
∆FFt ×Bit−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
∆FFt ×Bit−1 ×Medit 0.024 0.024 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.045
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗ (0.023)∗
∆FFt ×Bit−1 ×Bigit 0.139 0.138 0.181 0.184 0.183 0.185
(0.056)∗∗ (0.056)∗∗ (0.072)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗ (0.071)∗∗∗
Bit−1 0.175 0.175 0.052 0.049 0.056 0.063
(0.066)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗∗ (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.068)
Bit−1 ×Medit -0.315 -0.315 -0.157 -0.152 -0.153 -0.160
(0.166)∗ (0.166)∗ (0.150) (0.149) (0.154) (0.154)
Bit−1 ×Bigit -0.678 -0.640 -0.445 -0.340 -0.354 -0.379
(0.271)∗∗ (0.285)∗∗ (0.400) (0.424) (0.425) (0.411)
∆log(GDPt) 0.936 0.904 0.249 0.151 0.083
(0.357)∗∗∗ (0.356)∗∗ (0.407) (0.404) (0.419)
∆log(GDPt)×Medit -0.172 -0.134 0.413 0.502 0.437 0.257
(0.916) (0.914) (0.873) (0.871) (0.895) (0.893)
∆log(GDPt)×Bigit 0.257 0.486 1.503 2.041 2.083 1.607
(1.955) (1.968) (2.167) (2.196) (2.202) (2.105)
∆MTGt 0.022 0.037 0.037
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
∆MTGt ×Medit -0.018 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022
(0.010)∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
∆MTGt ×Bigit 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.011
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
∆log(Lit−1) 0.234 0.237 0.216 0.222 0.223 0.224
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗
∆log(Appsit) 0.071 0.074 0.074 0.080
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
N 12711 12711 8431 8431 8268 8268
R2 0.097 0.100 0.148 0.156 0.157 0.145
Table 3.3 shows the results of bank-year dynamic panel regressions where the dependent variable is
on-balance-sheet residential mortgage loan growth, ∆log(Lit). Covariates include the change in the
average annual Fed Funds rate, ∆FFt, the change in the thirty-year conventional mortgage rate,
∆MTGt, GDP growth, ∆log(GDPt), bank-level application growth, ∆log(Appsit), bank’s balance
sheet liquidity, Bit, size category dummies, Bigit and Medit, Federal Reserve District dummies (not
reported), linear time trends (not reported), as well as various interactions. In the specifications
reported in columns (5) and (6), bank-level application growth, ∆log(Appsit) is instrumented by
local application growth in the MSAs where the bank lends (IV Appsit, described in Section 3.2).
The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by bank, allowing for heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance (of two-sided tests)
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Regressions of mortgage loan growth on monetary policy shocks fit sepa-
rately for bank capitalization sub-samples
Low Capital High Capital
(< 50th percentile) (> 50th percentile)
∆FFt ×Medit -0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.012)
∆FFt ×Bigit -0.069 0.028
(0.022)∗∗∗ (0.046)
∆FFt ×Bit−1 -0.029 0.001
(0.022) (0.009)
∆FFt ×Bit−1 ×Medit 0.054 0.040
(0.038) (0.032)




Bit−1 ×Medit 0.145 -0.396
(0.247) (0.195)∗∗






∆MTGt ×Medit -0.021 -0.023
(0.015) (0.013)∗








Table 3.4 shows the results of bank-year dynamic panel regressions where the dependent variable
is on-balance-sheet residential mortgage loan growth, ∆log(Lit). The two columns correspond to
estimates obtained from (approximately) equal-sized disjoint sub-samples constructed by sorting
banks on leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital to total assets). In the left column, the estimates from the
sub-sample consisting of banks below the 50th percentile are reported. In the right column, estimates
from the sub-sample consisting of banks above the 50th percentile are reported. The regression
specification is the same as that of column (6) in Table 3.3. The standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by bank, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote statistical significance (of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Quarterly regressions of loan growth on monetary policy shocks
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small Banks 0.000 -0.000 -0.007 -0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Medium Banks 0.046 0.044 0.030 0.029
(0.020)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.017)∗ (0.017)∗
Big Banks 0.076 0.075 0.039 0.036
(0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.042)
Medium - Small 0.046 0.045 0.036 0.036
(0.022)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.020)∗ (0.020)∗
Big - Small 0.076 0.076 0.046 0.043
(0.051) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043)
∆MTGit−τ Yes Yes
∆log(Appsit−4) Yes Yes
N 55543 55543 35192 35192
R2 0.084 0.085 0.078 0.079
Table 3.5 shows the results of bank-quarter dynamic panel regressions where the dependent variable
is on-balance-sheet residential loan growth. The regression specification corresponds to the the






















The regression is fit separately for banks in each size category. Reported are estimates of
∑4
j=0 φj
and the differences in these estimates across the bank size categories. These coefficients represent
the degree to which balance sheet liquidity mitigates the effects of policy. Column (1) shows the es-
timates from the standard specification; columns (2), (3), and (4), include additional (non-standard)
controls. In all cases, balance sheet liquidity plays a larger role in mitigating the effects of policy
shocks at larger banks. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by bank, allowing for
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
(of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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CHAPTER IV
Monetary Policy and Banks’ Risk-Taking
4.1 Introduction
Does loose monetary policy contribute to excessive risk-taking by financial inter-
mediaries? The recent financial crises in the U.S. and Europe have reignited interest
in this question—one which has important implications for the future conduct of
monetary policy and the design of macro-prudential regulation. In this chapter, I use
loan-level data on banks’ lending in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis to examine
how banks’ risk-taking responds to monetary policy. I find that the traditional proxy
for a bank’s exposure to agency problems—capitalization—is a key determinant in a
bank’s response: banks with low capital levels increase risk-taking following a mon-
etary expansion by much more than their better-capitalized peers, suggesting that
bank owners’ incentives to risk shift—to take more risk than they would in the ab-
sence of bank debt—are exacerbated by loose policy. My approach is the first to use
U.S. loan-level data to measure banks’ risk-taking from contemporaneous underwrit-
ing standards, allowing me to exploit within-bank variation in risk-taking. As in the
previous chapter, I analyze data on thrifts—banks that specialize in mortgage lending.
By focusing on thrifts, I avoid undesirable heterogeneity in banks’ business models,
lending opportunities, and portfolios that complicate analyses of the broader bank
population. My study makes contributions to the understanding of monetary policy
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transmission, the causes of financial crises, and the efficient design macro-prudential
regulation.
It is widely recognized that credit expansions are associated with financial crises.1
Monetary policy that is “too loose” is frequently implicated in contributing to exces-
sive credit growth. Most recently, in the European debt crisis, many commentators
have blamed the one size fits all monetary policy of the Euro area for fueling excessive
credit growth in the periphery (where economic conditions warranted higher rates)
while too loose monetary policy in the U.S. has been blamed for fueling the housing
boom that led to the sub-prime crisis. Empirical evidence for such claims have been
provided by Taylor (2008) (in the U.S. context), and Maddaloni and Peydró (2011)
(for U.S. and Europe). In these studies, the notion that policy is too loose is fun-
damentally macro-economic: it is based on the idea that the level of the policy rate
is inappropriate for the given macro-economic conditions.2 However, although it is
not difficult to see how policy that is too low can lead to inefficient allocations, losses
in social welfare, and inflation, it is far from obvious how it can explain the types
of spectacular excesses that have characterized the recent crises.3 A natural place to
look for such explanations are distorted incentives stemming from agency problems
in the financial sector.
1. Schularick and Taylor (2009) demonstrate that credit growth is a powerful predictor of crises
using a historical data set covering fourteen countries over the 1870–2008 period. A more narrative
argument is provided in Kindleberger (1978), who devotes a chapter to the role of credit expansion in
the development of financial crisis, echoing the arguments of Minsky (1986). Earlier commentators
including Smith (1776) and Schumpeter (1934) also stress the role of credit expansion, or “over-
trading”.
2. Both focus on Taylor rule residuals, which—presumably—represent deviations from the appro-
priate (or “natural”) level for the policy rate.
3. Asset price bubbles and “speculative frenzies” have been noted as the hallmarks of financial
crises by economic historians (see previous footnote). The recent housing crises in U.S. and Europe
have generated countless anecdotes in the financial press about lending behavior that (in hindsight)
appear to have defied business sense. These include “LIAR” loans, loans without (or with negative)
equity, loans with payments that exceed borrowers’ income, etc. Such excesses receive only limited
treatment in the macro-economic literature, and when they are considered, they are often treated
as the results of an exogenous process that (for unspecified reasons) generates deviations in asset
prices away from “fundamentals” (see for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke and
Gertler (2001)).
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Agency problems are one of the central concerns of the corporate finance literature.
A bank, being a highly levered firm with a investments that are difficult to monitor, is
particularly exposed to agency conflict between its equity-holders (the bank’s owners)
and its debt-holders (mainly, the depositors). Leverage, coupled and limited liability
means that bank owners hold option-like claims on the banks’ cash flows (Merton
(1977)). As a result, increasing the volatility of a bank’s assets increases the value
of the owners’ claims. Thus, substituting risky assets for safe assets may benefit a
bank’s owners, even if such substitutions lead to reductions in the value of total bank
assets; owners may even benefit from funding negative-NPV projects (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)).
Financial theory would suggest that bank owners’ incentives to risk-shift—-to
invest in inferior assets at the expense of debt-holders—would be recognized by ratio-
nal debt-holders (i.e. depositors) who would then demand additional returns, require
monitoring or audits, or simply withdraw funding. In any case, a bank’s owners would
bear the costs of agency ex-ante, and ex-post occurrences of risk-shifting would not—
in themselves—be a matter of great concern: they would simply be a manifestation
of the second best.
However, there are reasons to suspect that banks’ financing arrangements do not
represent optimal contracting in any conventional sense. Banks are unique: their
liabilities serve as money and consequently banks play a critical role in the payments
system. Because the payments system is indispensable to the functioning of the
economy, banks have historically received considerable attention from government
regulators: very little in banking has been uninfluenced by regulation. Banks are—
or have at one point—been subject to restrictions on the types of liabilities they
may issue, the pricing of their liabilities, and the composition of their assets. They
have also enjoyed unique benefits such as access to the lender of last resort, mis–
priced deposit insurance, and various implicit government guarantees. Given that
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the banks’ regulatory environment is shaped by political—rather than economic—
forces and considering the important role that banks play in the allocation of capital,
deficiencies in the “design” of this regulatory system has potentially large welfare
implications.4
In particular, government’s provision of guarantees for bank deposits and for the
banking system as a whole has important implications on the significance of risk-
shifting problems in banking. Depositors who bear little risk have minimal incentive
to monitor; if the government fails to provide the requisite level of monitoring, bank
owners’ risk-shifting incentives can lead to excessive risk-taking. The Savings and
Loan Crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s provided a dramatic demonstration of
how such agency problems can lead to inefficient allocations and significant financial
disruptions (Keeley (1990), Barth (1991)). The subsequent adoption of Basel capital
requirements was aimed in part at alleviating the agency problems resulting from
high leverage.
While risk-shifting and bank capital have received considerable attention in the
literature, their interaction with monetary policy has not.5 Although loose monetary
policy is frequently associated with banking crises, its effects on the agency problems
between bank owners and debt-holders are theoretically ambiguous. By increasing
liquidity in the banking system, loose policy can abet risk-shifting by propping up
the value of risky assets (as in Allen and Gale (2000)) or by decreasing agents’ risk
perceptions (as in Farhi and Tirole (2012)). Loose policy may also increase opportu-
nities for risk-shifting as investors’ “search for yield” (Minsky (1986), Rajan (2006))
reduces their monitoring incentives. On the other hand, by increasing the value
of risky assets and by widening bank intermediation spreads, loose policy can raise
banks’ net-worth and thereby reduce the motive to risk-shift (Dell’Ariccia, Laeven,
and Marquez (2011), De Nicolò et al. (2010)). Thus, the effect of monetary policy on
4. More complete arguments to this effect can be found in Kane (1986).
5. For an analysis of the risk-taking–bank capital relationship, see Calem and Rob (1999).
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banks owners’ risk-shifting incentives is ultimately an empirical question. The goal
of this analysis is to distinguish between some of these competing hypotheses.
This study contributes to the emerging literature on the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy transmission. Coined by Borio and Zhu (2012), the risk-taking
channel covers a range of mechanisms through which monetary policy may affect
the risk perceptions or risk-tolerance of economic agents, leading to real effects on
the economy. The potential mechanisms are diverse and have distinct implications for
policy—thus, differentiating between them is important. For example, the simplest
way in which a risk-taking channel can operate is via banks’ portfolio optimization
problem. Under fairly general conditions, and in the absence of additional financial
frictions, reductions in the return on the risk-free asset leads economic agents to tilt
their portfolios toward riskier assets.6 In this setting, observed changes in risk-taking
following a monetary loosening would be entirely appropriate (i.e. efficient) and would
not warrant concern or regulatory action. Similarly, if agency problems are absent,
but liquidation is costly, risk-neutral, value-maximizing banks would act in a risk-
averse manner. The degree of a bank’s effective risk-aversion would be determined by
its proximity to the default boundary: if a bank had low net worth, its effective risk
aversion would be high. Thus, under-capitalized banks would avoid risky projects
and their portfolios would be relatively insensitive to changes in policy.7 Finding
such a pattern in the data would suggest that too little risk (relative to the fist-best
without liquidation costs) was undertaken by the banks, and that loose monetary
policy does not contribute to excessive risk-taking. Alternatively, if banks are subject
6. The general conditions being decreasing relative risk aversion which ensures that increases to
wealth leads to higher risk tolerance. The absence of frictions is not complete as some frictions—
sticky prices or wages—are assumed for the sake of non-neutrality of money (as in Ball, Mankiw, and
Romer (1988). The absence of additional frictions refers to frictions—such as agency problems—in
the financial sector.
7. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) develop one such model. Well-capitalized banks (efficiently) hold
more risk and (efficiently) respond to loose policy by increasing risk-taking based on the portfolio
considerations. Under-capitalized banks’ effective risk aversion is too high (relative to first best with
no liquidation costs). There is an implicit assumption that the net-worth effects of monetary policy
are not large enough to materially change an under-capitalized bank’s level of effective risk-aversion.
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to agency problems of the risk-shifting type, these problems may be exacerbated by
loose policy. For example, bank debt-holders may have nominal yield targets which
facilitates financing for banks pursuing high risk strategies when nominal yields are
low. In this case, one would expect to observe risk-taking that is higher and more
responsive to policy at under-capitalized banks. Finding this pattern would suggest
that regulatory arrangements are inadequate, and that loose policy contributes to
excessive risk-taking. The focus here shall be on this last—less benign—mechanism;
key to its identification are interactions between monetary policy, bank capital, and
risk-taking.8
My approach is to examine this mechanism by exploiting loan-level data on U.S.
thrifts’ mortgage lending. Thrifts are relatively undiversified banks, with a heavy
concentration in residential mortgage loans.9 Because provisions of the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act require mortgage lenders to disclose loan-level detail on mortgage
applications and their disposition, thrifts provide a unique opportunity to examine
the evolution of risk-taking at the bank level. Using these disclosures, I measure
each bank’s risk-taking using underwriting standards revealed through each bank’s
propensity to approve a constant quality loan and banks’ exposures to their borrow-
ers local economic risks. I find that banks’ risk-taking response to monetary policy
is mediated by bank capitalization: banks with low capital have a more pronounced
response to policy: their risk-taking increases considerably following a loosening while
at their better-capitalized peers, risk-taking is largely unchanged. My findings are
broadly consistent with the key premise of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
8. Throughout, I focus on the agency problem between bank owners and debt-holders. Alterna-
tively, agency issues between bank owners and managers can produce excessive risk-taking. Acharya
and Naqvi (2012) develop a model where the agency problem originates in bank owners’ reluctance
to audit bank managers’ effort; consequently, audits only occur when there is a liquidity shortage. In
their model, the managers’ equilibrium compensation contract is based on loan volume, so managers
take excessive risk if audits are unlikely to occur. Savers’ preference for bank deposits over direct
investment (say in turbulent economic conditions) and abundant central bank liquidity decrease the
risk of such an audit.
9. Thrifts are described in Chapter II.
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transmission: loose policy increases risk-taking. More importantly, this increase is
most pronounced where agency problems are most severe, suggesting that loose policy
aggravates certain agency problems.
The interactions between bank capital and monetary policy have previously been
explored in the literature on the credit channels of monetary policy transmission
(Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). There, the focus has been on banks’ capital con-
straint limiting the effectiveness of the bank lending channel (Kishan and Opiela
(2000), Kishan and Opiela (2006)) and on monetary policy’s impact on banks’ cap-
ital constraints (Van den Heuvel (2002)).10. These effects have been referred to as
the bank capital channel, and the associated literature has—as with the bank lending
channel—explored how monetary policy affects the quantity of loans that banks can
supply, but has largely ignored implications on the quality of banks’ lending.
Studies of the quality of banks’ lending in response to monetary policy are limited.
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) use loan officer surveys in the U.S. and Euro-area to
examine aggregate measures of lending standards. They find that low short-term rates
soften lending standards while low long-term rates do not, suggesting that monetary
policy plays a special role in banks’ risk-taking.11 The approach here is more like that
of Jiménez et al. (2010), who use extensive loan-level data on Spanish banks’ lending
to examine the effects of monetary policy on the cross-section of banks’ risk-taking.
They too find that low capital banks increase risk-taking more in response to loose
policy.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the
empirical strategy and data. In Section 4.3, I discuss my results. In the final section
I conclude with a discussion of the findings.
10. In the former, a bank subject to a binding capital constraint cannot increase the supply of
loans in response to an increased availability of reserves. In the latter, monetary policy alters banks’
capital constraints through its effects on asset prices and net interest margins.
11. Although Lown and Morgan (2006) failed to find such effects using similar data.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
The goal of this analysis is to identify cross-sectional differences in the risk-taking
response to monetary policy of banks subject to varying degrees of agency problems.
Of particular interest is the response of banks with a relatively large exposure to
agency problems.
Bank’s exposure to agency problems is not directly observable, and as is common
in the literature, I proxy agency problems by a measure of the banks’ capitalization,
specifically the leverage ratio. I divide banks into three capitalization categories based
on their leverage, with cutoffs at the 5% and 10% level.
My analysis of changes in the banks’ risk-taking employs a similar identification
strategy to the one used in my study of banks’ quantity response (see Section 3.2).
Here, the focus is on changes to banks’ risk-taking, Γit, in response to changes in
monetary policy, ∆FFt. I mainly rely on dynamic panel regressions of the following
form:














The dynamic panel structure is used to take account of partial adjustment to bank’s
risk-taking policy arising from adjustment costs: changing lending practices may
requires costly action (e.g. retraining loan officers) whereas continuing with the status
quo involves no upfront costs. The change in the policy rate (here, the Fed Funds
rate), ∆FFt, is the monetary policy indicator. Xjt are other macroeconomic and
bank-level variables intended to control for demand effects: GDP growth, long-term
mortgage rates, and bank-level growth in loan demand.
To measure growth in a bank’s loan demand, I start by using HMDA data to total
the dollar amount of a banks’ loan applications in a given year. This yields a measure
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of the demand for bank credit faced by each bank, Appsit. To measure credit demand
growth, I take the difference in logs of this measure. As a bank’s applications may
be endogenous to its ability to supply credit, I instrument each bank’s loan demand
using the local demand in the areas where each bank lends.12
The controls are interacted with the category dummies to allow for arbitrary
category-level differences in the coefficients. The lag structure is assumed to be AR(1).
For the most part, I maintain the assumption of no bank fixed effects, implying within-
category homogeneity in unconditional expected loan growth rates. Doing so assumes
away the problems of fixed effects in dynamic panel models described in Nickell (1981).
The coefficients of most interest are on the category dummy interactions, i.e. the γτ s.
The main problem here is one of measurement: how can risk-taking be observed?
In most studies of banking, risk-taking is unobservable; here however, the HMDA
loan-level data provides a unique opportunity to do so. Because this data includes
information on applicant characteristics as well as the banks’ loan approval decisions,
it can be used to construct proxies for bank’s underwriting standards. To do so,
I first estimate a loan approval model, M, using application data from all banks
(including out-of-sample banks) over the entire sample period (I exclude non-bank
originations and OTD loans). I then use this model to score each (in-sample) bank’s
loan applications; the extent to which a bank approves more loans that the model
predicts represents the (relative) laxness of its underwriting standards.
To estimate the loan approval model, M, I fit a logistic regression:
E[approvedj|Wj] = logit−1(β ·Wj + εj), (4.2)
where j indexes over the loan applications, approvedj is an indicator variable indicat-
ing whether the loan was approved, and Wj is a vector of application characteristics.
This model gives the estimated probability of a loan with a certain set of character-
12. Additional details on the construction of these measures can be found in Chapter III.
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istics, Wj, being approved:
ÊM[approvedj|Wj] = logit−1(βs ·Wj).
With the loan approval model,M, I estimate a bank’s risk-taking Γit, as the ratio of
the bank’s realized approval rate on its applications from that year to the expected








My measure of risk-taking can be interpreted as a bank’s propensity to “over-approve”
loan applications. An over-approval ratio of Γit = 1.05 indicates that the bank ap-
proved 5% more of its loan applications than the model predicted.
The application characteristics that I include in the loan approval model attempt
to capture factors relevant to underwriting subject to the limitations of the HMDA
data. Along with these, I include dummies for the applicant’s MSA (interacted with
all subsequent variables) to allow for arbitrary geographic differences in the under-
writing model. I include dummies indicating whether the loan had a high (above
28%) or medium (above 20%) payment-to-income (PTI) ratio (as calculated from the
loan amount and the prevailing 30-year conventional mortgage rate), and the ratio of
borrower’s income to his MSA’s median to proxy for the borrower’s relative financial
strength. I also include dummies indicating whether the loan is for an owner-occupied
residence or a refinancing. Finally, I include a dummy indicating whether the bor-
rower is black or Hispanic: this serves as a proxy for the borrower’s credit history
(interacted with all other variables).13
13. Borrowers’ actual credit scores are a prominent omission from the HMDA reports; this has led
to considerable debate about the degree to which racial and ethnic disparities in lenders’ denial rates
can be attributed to discrimination. Munnell et al. (1996) analyzed a subset of the HMDA data that
was augmented with credit scores and other borrower characteristics. They conclude that “minority
65
Figure 4.1 plots the time series of median changes in banks’ over-approval rates
for my sample. The pattern does not reveal any obvious secular trends. In Figure
4.2, I plot the median change in over-approval rates against changes in the Fed Funds
rate; this reveals a positive association between increases in over-approval rates and
monetary loosening.
In addition to the risk measure based on banks’ over-approval rates, I also consider
the risk originating in banks’ exposure to the local economic conditions faced by their
borrowers. The risks from the geographic composition of banks’ lending has recently
received considerable attention: Mian and Sufi (2009) has argued that the Sub-prime
crisis can be traced back to growth of mortgage credit in neighborhoods with stagnant
(or declining) income growth. Similarly, Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order (2011)
attribute much of the mortgage melt-down to the extension of credit in areas with poor
economic fundamentals, potentially resulting from banks’ mis-estimation of default
risks.14
To get at this geographic aspect of banks’ risk exposures, I begin with the Life
Of Loan Default metric from University Financial Associates LLC (UFA). Estimated
from loan-level foreclosure experience of securitized loans, this metric assess the rel-
ative default risk of a loan originated in a given ZIP-code in a given year.15 16
I convert these ZIP-code-level metrics to census-tract-level using “crosswalk” map-
applicants, on average, do have less wealth, weaker credit histories, and higher loan-to-value ratios
than white applicants, and that these disadvantages do account for a large portion of the difference
in denial rates.” These findings suggest that in my analysis—to the extent that lenders’ propensity
to discriminate is not a function of monetary policy—race and ethnicity are reasonable proxies for
applicants’ credit histories.
14. See also Murfin (2012), who provide evidence that banks adjusted underwriting standards to
recent loan loss experience.
15. The UFA life-of-loan default multipliers, capture the relative default experience of a constant-
quality loan originated at different times and in different places. That is, if LOL60606,2005:9 = 1.5
and LOL48105,2009:12 = 1.0, then a loan originated in September 2005 for a property in ZIP-code
60606 would be expected to default at a rate approximately 1.5 times greater than a similar loan
originated in December of 2009 in ZIP-code 48105.
16. The UFA metrics are provided at a monthly frequency. I annualize them by weighing the
monthly data by the U.S. Census New One Family Houses Sold series. The metrics are multipliers,
with 1 corresponding to the average default rate in the 1990s. Additional details can be found in
the appendix of Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order (2011).
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pings provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.17 This
yields a series of life of loan default multiplier vectors, dt (i.e. each element of dt
corresponds to a census tract).
Next, I use each banks annual loan application registers (LARs) to construct port-
folio weight-vectors, wit, where each element of wit contains the fraction of bank-year
i, t’s loan originations (and purchases) that occurred in a particular census tract.18 I
use the dollar value of loan originations and purchases to compute the weights.
With the preceding definitions,
wit · dt,
can be said to measure bank i’s exposure to local risks from its loan originations
(and acquisitions) in period t. For the purposes of measuring a bank’s response to
macro-economic conditions, this measure has a problem: it captures passive changes
to a bank’s risk exposure. That is, banks with constant loan origination policies
will experience changes to their local risk exposure due to changes in local economic
conditions, (i.e. due to changes in the dt vector). To capture only the active aspect
of a bank’s risk exposure—the exposure arising from a bank’s actions (i.e. changes in
loan origination policies)—I define a slightly different measure, the active local risk
exposure:
Λit ≡ (∆wit) · dt.
Whereas the over-approval rate, Γit, is intended to capture risks arising from a bank’s
decision as to whom to lend to, the active local risk, Λit, is intended to capture changes
to the risk arising from banks’ decisions as to where to lend.
The identification strategy here amounts to a generalized difference-in-difference
17. These files may be found at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.
html.
18. The LARs are from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act filings are described in Section 2.2.
67
approach. That is, I examine cross-category differences in banks’ risk-taking, pre- and
post- monetary policy shock. Of interest here are differences in response attributable
to agency problems, so I divide banks into three categories (LowCapt, MedCapt,
and HiCapt) based on their leverage ratio—a traditional proxy of bank’s exposure
to agency problems. To define the categories, I set leverage ratio cutoffs at 5% and
10%.19
Table 4.1 summarizes aggregate balance sheets of banks in each capitalization
category at the start of the sample period. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize the variables
used in the analysis.
4.3 Results
Over-approval Rates
Results from tests of factors affecting banks’ risk-taking (Equation 4.1) are pre-
sented in Table 4.5. Each column corresponds to a variant of the specification de-
scribed in Section 4.2, and in each case the dependent variable is the over-approval
measure of risk-taking, Γit. Column (1) corresponds to a pooled specification, col-
umn (2) includes time fixed effects, while column (3) dispenses with the dynamics and
includes a bank fixed effect. All reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity con-
sistent and clustered by bank and all tests are two-sided. The coefficients of primary
interest are the interactions between monetary policy, ∆FFt, and the capitalization
category dummies (∆FFt × LowCapit−1 and ∆FFt ×HiCapit−1) which correspond
to cross-category differences in the response.
In the specifications without time fixed-effects (column (1) and (3)), the total
19. That is, banks in the LowCapt category cannot be “well-capitalized” according to the standard
regulatory definition (i.e. leverage ratio of more than 5%, risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio of
more than 6%, and total risk-weighted capital of more than 10%). For the purposes of proxying
agency issues, the leverage ratio is the most relevant quantity as it excludes “capital” items such as
subordinated debt, which—in terms of the equity–debt conflict—do not represent the owners’ “skin
in the game”.
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“effect” of monetary policy can be estimated. There, for reasonably well-capitalized
banks (i.e. those in the baseline, MedCapt, category), monetary policy is not as-
sociated with changes in risk-taking (i.e. the estimates of the ∆FFt coefficient are
statistically indistinguishable from zero).
However, for banks with low capitalization (and presumably significant agency
problems) there is an effect: risk-taking at banks belonging to the LowCapt category
is more sensitive to monetary policy. In the pooled specification of column (1), the
same 100bp shock is associated with a 6.2% increase in the over-approval ratio (sum
of the ∆FFt and ∆FFt×LowCapit−1 coefficient estimates). In the specification with
time fixed effects of column (2), total effects cannot be estimated but the differential
effect paints a similar picture. For low capital banks, a 100bp decrease in the Fed
Funds rate is associated with a 7% increase in the over-approval rate relative to banks
in the baseline, MedCapt, category.
Based on the dynamic panel specifications, risk-taking at banks with low capital
appears to be significantly more sensitive to short-term policy rates than risk-taking
at better-capitalized banks. The low capital banks also exhibit lower persistence in
the their-risk taking, with an AR(1) parameter estimate of approximately 0.5–0.6,
as compared to 0.7 for banks in the MedCapt categories, respectively. Low capital
banks also appear to have higher over-approval ratios overall. For low capital banks,
the unconditional expected over-approval ratio is approximately 1.3; for banks in the
medium and high capitalization categories it is 1.0.
Estimated differences between banks in the medium and high capitalization cat-
egories are generally small and statistically insignificant. The main exception is that
banks in the high capitalization categories exhibit somewhat higher persistence in
their over-approval rates (i.e. their AR(1) parameter is larger).
In column (3), I report the estimates from a specification without dynamics; this
corresponds to the case of costless adjustment in banks’ underwriting standards. The
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estimates are similar, with low capital banks exhibiting the same differential response
to monetary policy shocks.
It also appears that low capital banks may increase risk-taking in response to
increases in mortgage rates: the coefficient estimates for ∆MTGit×LowCapit−1 are
positive and statistically significant in two of the specifications. This is probably
due to mortgage rates entering into the underwriting model through the payment-to-
income (PTI) ratio: other things being equal, a higher mortgage rate increases the
PTI ratio which reduces the underwriting model’s prediction of a loan being approved.
Thus, riskier banks (those not concerned about underwriting ratios) will appear to
increase risk-taking when mortgage rates are high.
Active Local Risk
Table 4.6 reports estimates from the regressions of active local risk exposure.
Again, estimates from four alternative specifications are reported.
Unlike the over-approval ratio, the active local risk exposure does not increase
more at under-capitalized banks following a monetary policy shock. In all specifica-
tions, the coefficient estimates on the interactions between monetary policy, ∆FFt,
and the capitalization categories are very small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that loose policy causes low capital
banks to shift lending toward riskier areas.
However, changes in mortgage rates do seem to have differential effects. Low cap-
ital banks take active local risk exposures—they shift lending toward riskier areas—
following declines in mortgage rates. A 100bp decrease in mortgage rates is associated
with a differential increase of 0.014–0.018 in the average life of loan default multiplier
for loans originated at low capital banks relative to the baseline (MedCapt) banks.
This increase is not attributable to changes in the local economic conditions in the
bank’s area of operations; rather it is due to changes in where the banks chooses
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to lend. Somewhat unexpectedly, this is also the case for the high capital banks
(HiCapt), although the estimated magnitude of the effect is smaller by a factor of
three.
4.4 Discussion
At least as far as underwriting (i.e. the over-approval rate) is concerned, it appears
that agency problems are a factor in banks’ risk-taking decisions as well as in their
risk-taking sensitivity to monetary policy. The former finding is not at all surprising
given standard theories of banks’ risk-shifting incentives. It does however represent
a fairly direct measure of the problem. The latter finding—that risk-taking is more
sensitive to monetary policy at low capital banks—is not entirely obvious. First,
as argued earlier, one potential effect of policy is to increase bank profitability and
net worth and in so doing reduce the incentives for bank owner/managers to behave
badly when capital is low. This does not appear to be the case; my analysis provides
evidence for the alternate story in which “easy money” encourage banks to take
excessive risks.
These findings are consistent with several recent empirical studies. Jiménez et al.
(2010) report similar results in their analysis of lending at Spanish banks. Using an
exhaustive loan register covering all of Spanish banks’ commercial loans going back
to 1984, they find that bank risk-taking (measured as loans to firms with a history of
doubtful loans) increases following expansionary policy shocks; this increase is most
pronounced at under-capitalized banks. Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydro (2009) rely
on the Bolivian loan register, and they too find that low capital banks risk-taking
most in response to expansionary policy shocks.
One objection to this interpretation of the results is that risk-taking may be
confounded with the effects of capital constraints. That is, a bank with very low
capital may be prevented from lending due to a regulatory capital requirement. Loose
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policy relaxes this constraint (through its effect on asset values) and allows previously-
constrained banks to lend. If the bank’s marginal borrower is of a lower quality
than its average borrower—a reasonable supposition—then this could account for the
observed pattern in the data even in the absence of any agency problems. If this is
indeed the case, then under-capitalized banks should also exhibit a larger quantity
response (i.e. increase lending more in response to loose policy). Table 4.7 presents
the estimates from a regression of residential mortgage loan growth, ∆log(Lit), on the
usual covariates. There is no evidence for differentials in the quantity response across
bank capital categories, casting doubt on the binding capital constraint interpretation.
The lack of a direct relationship between policy rates and risk-taking as measured
by active local risk exposure raises additional doubts. However, it may be that banks
cannot easily adjust the geographic composition of their lending. This might explain
the differential response to changes in long-term (mortgage) rates: banks may delay
“geographical” risk-taking until there’s an expectation of low policy rates to persist
into the future.
In addition, one might doubt the external validity of the results: thrifts may not
have been exposed to the same levels of market discipline as commercial banks, or
they may have enjoyed an especially lax regulatory regime. The latter is often taken
as conventional wisdom and this perception played a major role in the elimination of
the OTS.20 On the other hand, the thrifts’ simple business model should have made
regulatory oversight and market discipline easier to implement, which would point
toward agency problems playing an even larger role in risk-taking in the broader
(more complex) population. Similarly, this simplicity almost certainly contributed to
20. Congressman Barney Frank has famously referred to the regulation provided by the OTS as
worse than the “policing provided by meter maids” (Dennis (2009)). Meanwhile, then-acting OTS
chief, John Bowman, asserted in a speech in Tokyo that the Dodd-Frank Act made the OTS a “scape-
goat” (Hopkins (2010)). His claims are perhaps buttressed by the fact that the OTS’s predecessor—
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board—witnessed a similar fate thirty years earlier largely due to
circumstances beyond its control. There are few extant studies of regulators’ performance in this
period, but Donelson and Zaring (2010) find some limited support for the idea that OTS did no
worse than the other regulators.
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thrifts’ lower share of subsequent government bailouts, and ex ante expectations of
such an outcome should have increased monitoring incentives.
Conclusion
Using bank-level and loan-level data on U.S. mortgage lending, I examine how
monetary policy affects banks’ lending standards. I find that a bank’s leverage ratio
is an important determinant to its response to policy—monetary loosening leads banks
with high leverage to increase risk-taking more than their better-capitalized peers.
A natural interpretation of these results is that agency issues lead to an “excessive”
risk-taking response to monetary loosening. This raises questions about the efficacy
of current macro-prudential regulation in constraining the behavior of even the most
conventional of financial intermediaries and creates doubt about the ability of ring-




























































25th and 75th Percentile
Figure 4.1: Growth in risk-taking
Figure 4.1 summarizes growth in banks’ (on-balance-sheet) risk-taking. Each year, median
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is a bank’s “over-approval” ratio: the extent to which a bank approves more loans than
would be expected given the observable characteristics of the applications it received. This
measure of risk-taking is computed using loan-level HMDA data on the banks’ mortgage
































































Figure 4.2: Monetary policy and risk-taking
Figure 4.2 plots the median growth in banks’ risk-taking (see Figure 4.1) against contem-
poraneous monetary policy shocks (the change to the Fed Funds rate). Also plotted is the
univariate regression fit.
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LowCapi 1 0 0
HiCapi 0 0 1
Number of thrifts 262 1233 383
Mean assets ($ million) 772 437 200
Median assets ($ million) 123 114 66
Percent of total thrift assets 24 63 9
Assets 100 100 100
Cash 3 4 5
Interest bearing 1 2 4
Securities 30 24 23
FedFunds lent 1 1 2
Loans 57 65 65
Real estate loans 38 49 50
Consumer loans 3 3 7
C&I loans 1 1 1
Other assets 9 7 5
Liabilities and equity 100 100 100
Deposits 76 80 80
Insured deposits 73 76 77
Core deposits 69 71 72
Brokered deposits 3 1 0
FedFunds borrowed 4 3 0
Subordinated debt 0 0 0
Other liabilities 16 10 7
FHLB advances 11 8 2
Equity 4 7 13
Table 4.1 shows the aggregate balance sheet composition of banks in each capitalization category
as of 1992:IV. All balance sheet items are reported as a fraction of total assets. The capitalization
categories LowCapt, MedCapt, and HiCapt are formed based on cutoffs at the 5% and 10% leverage
ratio (the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets).
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LowCapi 1 0 0
HiCapi 0 0 1
Number of thrifts 3 391 423
Mean assets ($ million) 1256 3080 598
Median assets ($ million) 79 237 121
Percent of total thrift assets 0 82 17
Assets 100 100 100
Cash 16 2 3
Interest bearing 0 1 2
Securities 8 14 25
FedFunds lent 0 2 1
Loans 69 73 66
Real estate loans 39 54 32
Consumer loans 12 4 14
C&I loans 7 3 11
Other assets 7 9 5
Liabilities and equity 100 100 100
Deposits 72 62 52
Insured deposits 68 48 43
Core deposits 61 38 36
Brokered deposits 28 7 6
FedFunds borrowed 2 4 5
Subordinated debt 0 1 0
Other liabilities 20 23 17
FHLB advances 16 17 10
Equity 6 10 25
Table 4.2 shows the aggregate balance sheet composition of banks in each capitalization category
as of 2006:IV. All balance sheet items are reported as a fraction of total assets. The capitalization
categories LowCapt, MedCapt, and HiCapt are formed based on cutoffs at the 5% and 10% leverage
ratio (the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets).
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Table 4.3: Summary of variables (averages).
Average
Variable 1993Q4 2006Q4 Description
Nt 1732 817 Number of banks.
∆FFt -0.50 1.75 Change in the annual average of the Fed
Funds rate.
∆MTGt -1.07 0.55 Change in the annual average home mort-
gage rate (from Freddie Mac).
∆log(GDPit) 0.06 0.04 GDP growth.
∆log(Appsit) 0.15 -0.02 Growth in the bank’s mortgage applica-
tions.
LocalAppGrowthit 0.08 -0.01 Growth in mortgage applications in the
bank’s lending area.
HiCapit 0.26 0.52 High capitalization (Tier 1 Capital > 10%)
category.
MedCapit 0.66 0.48 Medium capitalization (Tier 1 Capital be-
tween 5% and 10%) category.
LowCapit 0.09 0.00 Low capitalization (Tier 1 Capital < 5%)
category.
Λit 0.00 0.00 The bank’s active local risk exposure.
Γit 1.06 1.07 The bank’s over-approval rate.
Table 4.3 summarizes the variables in the panel. Averages are reported for the first and last quarter
in the panel.
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Table 4.4: Summary of variables (standard deviations).
Std. Dev.
Variable 1993Q4 2006Q4 Description
∆log(Appsit) 0.62 0.50 Growth in the bank’s mortgage applica-
tions.
LocalAppGrowthit 0.16 0.11 Growth in mortgage applications in the
bank’s lending area.
Λit 0.05 0.07 The bank’s active local risk exposure.
Γit 0.22 0.23 The bank’s over-approval rate.
Table 4.4 summarizes the standard deviations of the variables in the panel. Standard deviations are
reported for the first and last quarter in the panel.
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Table 4.5: Regressions of over-approval rates on monetary policy shocks
Specification
Γit (1) (2) (3)
∆FFt × LowCapit−1 -0.059 -0.070 -0.067
(0.023)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗
∆FFt ×HiCapit−1 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆MTGt × LowCapit−1 0.038 0.039 0.057
(0.025) (0.022)∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
∆MTGt ×HiCapit−1 0.002 -0.001 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
∆log(GDPt)× LowCapit−1 -4.769 -3.273 -6.539
(2.827)∗ (2.658) (2.734)∗∗
∆log(GDPt)×HiCapit−1 0.183 0.047 0.223
(0.319) (0.278) (0.275)
∆log(Appsit) 0.026 0.021 0.020
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
∆log(Appsit)× LowCapit−1 0.044 0.018 0.014
(0.033) (0.030) (0.024)
∆log(Appsit)×HiCapit−1 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Γit−1 × LowCapit−1 -0.076 -0.181
(0.082) (0.080)∗∗










LowCapit−1 0.347 0.378 0.401
(0.186)∗ (0.185)∗∗ (0.153)∗∗∗
HiCapit−1 -0.057 -0.058 -0.000
(0.051) (0.041) (0.016)
Time Fixed Effects Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
N 9080 9003 9003
R2 0.454 0.496 0.018
Table 4.5 shows the results of bank-year dynamic panel regressions where the dependent variable
is bank’s risk-taking, as measured by the loan “over-approval” rate, Γit. In all specifications bank-
level application growth, ∆log(Appsit) is instrumented by local application growth in the MSAs
where the bank lends. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by bank, allowing for
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
(of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Regressions of active local risk exposure on monetary policy shocks
Specification
Λit (1) (2) (3)
∆FFt × LowCapit−1 0.009 0.009 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
∆FFt ×HiCapit−1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆MTGt × LowCapit−1 -0.014 -0.015 -0.018
(0.008)∗ (0.008)∗ (0.009)∗∗
∆MTGt ×HiCapit−1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002)∗ (0.002)∗ (0.002)
∆log(GDPt)× LowCapit−1 -0.267 -0.155 -0.140
(0.756) (0.755) (0.984)
∆log(GDPt)×HiCapit−1 0.011 0.012 0.007
(0.118) (0.118) (0.130)
∆log(Appsit)× LowCapit−1 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
∆log(Appsit)×HiCapit−1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Λit−1 × LowCapit−1 -0.110 -0.101
(0.078) (0.078)




LowCapit−1 0.006 0.001 -0.002
(0.042) (0.042) (0.054)
HiCapit−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)








Time Fixed Effects Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
N 8774 8774 9292
R2 0.079 0.077 0.013
Table 4.6 shows the results of bank-year panel regressions where the dependent variable is a bank’s
active local risk exposure, Λit. In all specifications bank-level application growth, ∆log(Appsit) is
instrumented by local application growth in the MSAs where the bank lends. The standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by bank, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank
correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance (of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Regressions of residential loan growth on monetary policy shocks
Specification
∆log(Lit) (1) (2) (3)
∆FFt × LowCapit−1 0.001 -0.008 -0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
∆FFt ×HiCapit−1 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
∆MTGt × LowCapit−1 -0.005 0.034 0.010
(0.033) (0.034) (0.028)
∆MTGt ×HiCapit−1 0.000 -0.007 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
∆log(GDPt)× LowCapit−1 1.619 1.413 0.968
(2.916) (2.939) (2.886)
∆log(GDPt)×HiCapit−1 -0.696 -0.697 -0.945
(0.366)∗ (0.370)∗ (0.376)∗∗
∆log(Appsit)× LowCapit−1 -0.039 -0.070 0.008
(0.038) (0.042)∗ (0.039)
∆log(Appsit)×HiCapit−1 -0.000 -0.007 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)






LowCapit−1 -0.107 -0.100 -0.037
(0.165) (0.165) (0.160)
HiCapit−1 0.019 0.019 0.035
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021)∗








Time Fixed Effects Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes
N 8331 7720 8985
R2 0.143 0.134 0.075
Table 4.7 shows the results of bank-year dynamic panel regressions where the dependent variable is
residential loan growth, ∆log(Lit). In all specifications bank-level application growth, ∆log(Appsit)
is instrumented by local application growth in the MSAs where the bank lends. The standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by bank, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank




Market Monitoring of Banks’ Risk-Taking
5.1 Introduction
A consequence of the recent series of financial crises is a an erosion of incentives
for market participants to monitor financial intermediaries. In the the aftermath
of the U.S. Sub-prime Crisis, the retail deposit insurance guarantee scheme has been
expanded significantly and the rescue of financial firms such as Bear Sterns, AIG, and
Citigroup further solidified the notion that firms “too big to fail” are in fact too big to
fail. In Europe, various implicit government guarantees on the liabilities of national
banking systems (notably, in Ireland and Spain) have become explicit. These types
of policy responses have a long tradition. In the U.S., the Federal deposit insurance
schemes (the FDIC, and the FSLIC) were spawned by the Great Crash of 1929.
Similarly, the failure of Continental Illinois in 1984 validated the notion of implicit
guarantees and “too big to fail”, while the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s
and early 1990s led to further strengthening of the explicit insurance schemes. With
each expansion of the government safety net provided to the banking system come
warnings of the moral hazard that it creates and its potential to fuel an even bigger
crisis in the future. Thus, a key question in the design of policy is the value of market
discipline: is anything lost when monitoring incentives are reduced? In this chapter,
I examine this issue in the context of the market for bank liabilities during the run-up
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to the U.S. Sub-prime Crisis.
Prior literature on bank monitoring by liability-holders has focused on their ability
to assess bank default risk using measures analogous to those used by bank regulators.
The approach is to determine whether the market for a bank’s liabilities responds
to the bank’s condition. Bank condition is typically summarized by balance sheet
ratios that proxy for different aspects of bank risk. There is a close correspondence
between the risk proxies and the inputs to bank regulators’ supervisory ratings (i.e.
CAMELS in the U.S.).1 Thus, the question being answered is whether investors
use the same information in their decision to supply funds as regulators use in their
supervisory assessments. Early empirical studies have focused on the price response,
and generally support the hypothesis that depositors exact a price for bank risk.
For example, Baer and Brewer (1986) and Hannan and Hanweck (1988) find that
bank risk factors influence the cross-section of CD yields. Brewer and Mondschean
(1994) examine the S&L Crisis period and find a positive relationship between a
S&L’s CD yield and its junk bond holdings. Ellis and Flannery (1992) employ a
time series methodology and find similar results at six large money center banks.
Flannery (1998) provides a comprehensive survey of this earlier literature. If banks
face a upward-sloping deposit supply schedule, then the presence of market discipline
should also be manifested through a quantity response; this has been examined in
studies such as Calomiris and Wilson (2004), Park and Peristiani (1998) and Peria
and Schmukler (2001) where bank risk is found to have a negative effect on deposit
quantities.
While prior studies find evidence of bank monitoring by liability-holders based
on information used by regulators in their risk assessments, it is not clear that the
existence of such monitoring has major implications on the moral hazard debate. If
market discipline does not complement regulatory discipline and if the market’s as-
1. CAMELS is an acronym for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquid-
ity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk.
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sessments are not more accurate (or timely) than those of regulators, then there is
not much of a case for preserving market discipline. Evidence on this complimentary
value of depositor monitoring is lacking, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that
it is absent. Bank regulators have natural advantages when it comes to obtaining
information about a bank’s condition: they employ trained, specialized examiners,
fund research departments devoted to banking issues, and have the power to compel
disclosure. They also have access to information that is not released to the public.
Studies by Berger and Davies (1998) and Cole and Gunther (1998) present evidence
that bank examiners are able to detect new “bad” information not available in reg-
ulatory filings. Similarly, DeYoung et al. (1998) argue that bank regulators collect
information that is priced by market participants only after a considerable delay.2
Moreover, the information used by regulators is—somewhat tautologically—the type
of information that is most amenable to regulatory action. Thus, if liability-holders’
monitoring adds value, it is unlikely to arise from their ability to duplicate regulatory
assessments.
In order to get at the question of whether market discipline provides any ad-
ditional value, augmenting the traditional approach is required: one must consider
information not summarized by the usual proxies of bank risk. As a practical matter,
this information needs to be both quantifiable yet difficult for regulators to use. A
failure of the former condition would preclude an econometric analysis while a failure
of the latter would make any market discipline so identified equally subject to the
preceding criticism.
In this analysis, I augment the traditional analysis with three additional measures
of a bank’s asset quality. The first, is the geographical make-up of a bank’s lending.
The second, is its underwriting standards. The third is the post-crisis performance
of its loans. I test whether a bank’s cost of funds responds to these measures of
2. More recently, Iyer, Puri, and Ryan (2013) find that depositor monitoring is largely a response
to prior regulatory action, and contains little “independent discipline”.
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asset quality. While prior studies have included banks’ asset quality as a default
risk factor, the proxies employed have largely been limited to lagged balance sheet
ratios such as non-performing assets or the historical volatility of the market value of
equity. However, in the case of mortgage lending, rising home prices make delinquency
and default easy to avoid, reducing the information content in such measures. It
is only when prices fall that the measures reveal the full extent of asset quality.
Moreover, because it is relatively simple to promulgate regulatory policies based on
such measures, any information contained in them may be better-used by regulators.3
As in the previous chapters, I focus on lending at U.S. thrifts—banks that spe-
cialize in mortgage lending—in the run-up to the Sub-prime Crisis. Several factors
contribute to making this is a unique venue for evaluating the potential value of mar-
ket monitoring. First, thrifts—being undiversified—provide a clean empirical setting:
lending standards in a thrift’s mortgage portfolio should be reflected rather directly
in its cost of funds as thrifts have little opportunity to offset increased risk in one
line of business (i.e. mortgage lending) with decreased risk in another (e.g. business
loans).4 Second, U.S. mortgage loans are a uniform, commoditized product subject
to detailed regulatory reporting requirements; consequently, mortgage lending stan-
dards are more readily quantified than lending standards for other types of loans.5
Third, circumstances around the crisis and its run-up are favorable to the analysis.
The sudden decline in home prices and its heterogeneous effect on banks’ post-crisis
loan performance reveals information about cross-sectional differences in banks’ pre-
crisis lending standards. In addition, this period was characterized by a large fraction
3. Various other measures of asset quality previously employed suffer similar problems. For exam-
ple, Brewer and Mondschean (1994) and Ellis and Flannery (1992) use a bank’s portfolio weight on
different asset classes (e.g. junk bonds vs. houses) to measure asset quality. Again, such measures
are problematic. On the one hand, they hide non-obvious risks (i.e. some types of home loans are
riskier than some types of junk bonds), and on the other hand they are easy for regulators to act on
(i.e. it is simple for regulators to assign risk-weights based on asset class).
4. Thrifts’ business model, and regulatory history is described in more detail in Chapter II.
5. A unique feature of mortgage lending is the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which mandates
the disclosure of details about individual loan applications.
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of thrifts’ deposit balances being uninsured, creating an incentive for monitoring by
large depositors. A final benefit of focusing on thrifts’ lending standards is that
regulators—who do not enjoy wide discretion in their action—may not be able to
respond to subtle (but consequential) changes in bank underwriting policies as easily
as market participants.
The last point—regulators’ limited ability to respond to banks’ lending standards—
will have important implications for the interpretation of my results. It is regulators
limited ability to monitor some aspect of bank behavior that gives market monitoring
a distinct advantage. But are regulators really limited in their ability to monitor
banks’ lending standards? The revelations about poor underwriting in the pre-crisis
period offers some prima facie evidence for the this proposition.6 More fundamen-
tally, a premise of democratic society is “rule of law” which places bounds on the
discretion afforded to government agents; it is therefore plausible to believe that reg-
ulators face considerable difficulties in adapting to new circumstances. It is difficult
to imagine a regulatory framework that would have allowed bank regulators to chas-
tise banks lending in Arizona or Florida in 2005 based on regulatory assessments
of those markets having poor future prospects. In addition to such calls requiring
considerable discretion, it would almost certainly expose the regulator to political
pressure from lawmakers in those states. Similarly, regulators may be subject to con-
flicting policy objectives. Expansion of mortgage lending to low-income borrowers
and neighborhoods provides a case in point: this while often implicated as contribut-
ing to the crisis, it also satisfied long-standing public policy objective of encouraging
home ownership.7
The null hypothesis that serves as the focus of my analysis is that market par-
ticipants fail to incorporate information about bank risk-taking (as proxied by my
6. It also provides evidence for the limitations of market monitoring. However, such a claim is
more tenuous, as incentives for market monitoring are relatively suppressed.
7. Specifically, provisions of the Community Reinvestment Act encouraged banks to extend loans
in low-income areas and to disadvantaged borrowers.
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measures) in their decision to supply funds. Rejection of this null suggests that mar-
ket monitoring provides additional value beyond regulatory monitoring under the
assumption that regulators are less able to use this type of information. To test the
hypothesis, I augment the traditional approach of the depositor monitoring literature
in which a bank’s cost of funds and deposit growth is regressed against balance-sheet
risk-factors with my measures of loan quality. I find that a bank’s cost of funds
is generally responsive to the geographical composition of its lending, while lending
standards appear to have little effect on the cost of funds. I find that the sensitiv-
ity of the cost of funds to geographical risks peaked in 2001 and then experienced
a prolonged decline over the 2002–2005 period; the pricing of geographical risks in
banks’ costs of funds reemerged in 2006. Similarly, I find that a bank’s cost of funds
did not begin to reflect the post-crisis performance of its portfolio until around 2005.
These findings suggest that risks not captured by balance-sheet ratios can be priced
by the market for banks’ liabilities; however, they also highlight the willingness of
this market to ignore such risks for prolonged periods.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 I describe the
data and empirical strategy. In Section 5.4 I present the results. The final section
concludes with a discussion of the findings.
5.2 Empirical Strategy
A typical approach to measuring market discipline on banks involves pooled cross-
sectional regressions of bank liability yields on various bank characteristics thought
to play a role in the default probability. This approach can be summarized by the
following reduced-form regression specification:




where i, t indexes over banks and time periods, yit is the yield on some bank liability,
xit is a vector of controls, and fit is a vector of risk factors (related to the inputs
for CAMELS ratings) proxied by various ratios of bank condition. The hypothesis
being tested is whether a bank’s cost of funding, yit, is affected by the bank’s riskiness
as measured by the risk-factors, fit: whether the λs correspond to expectations. In
effect, this answers the question of whether investors in bank liabilities price sources
of bank risk of concern to bank regulators.8
A limitation of this approach is that it fails to establish any additional benefit to
market monitoring. Evidence to the effect that investors monitor banks’ risk-taking
merely establishes investors’ duplication of regulators’ efforts. It is not at all clear
why such duplication would be desirable, or if duplication is to be avoided, which
monitor—regulator or investor—is preferred.
My approach is to extend the above empirical strategy by incorporating risk-
factors beyond simple balance-sheet ratios—ones based on information that is not easy
for regulators to act on. Thus, my approach corresponds to the extended specification:




where hit represents additional risk-factors potentially employed by the market, but
which regulators have a harder time using. If markets properly respond to (i.e. price)
these factors, then this suggests that market monitoring in the market for bank li-
abilities can compliment regulatory oversight. Thus, the focus on my analysis is on
the βs.
The dependent variable in my analyses is the bank’s cost of funding. If investors
in bank liabilities are concerned about a potential bank default, then the probability
of default should be reflected through a default premium in the bank’s cost of funds.9
8. Subject to the caveat that the strategy is effective at identifying causal effects.
9. And to the extent that such a default is correlated with non-diversifiable risk factors, a corre-
sponding risk-premium.
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Ideally, cost of funding would be reported separately for each type of bank liability
(e.g. “insured transaction account”, “large-denomination 1 year CD”), as certain
bank liabilities are insured. Unfortunately, such detail is not available, and it is
necessary to resort to summary measures. I estimate the overall cost of deposit fund-
ing (CODFit) from the quarterly deposit interest expense and the interest-bearing
deposit balance.10
For the standard balance-sheet risk factors, fit, I use measures commonly used in
the literature. These proxy for the inputs to regulatory CAMELS ratings (i.e. proxies
for: capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial effectiveness, earnings, liquidity, and
sensitivity to market risk). These measures are derived from banks’ balance sheets and
income statements. Capital adequacy is measured by the risk-adjusted Tier 1 Capital
ratio, Capitalit. The ratio of non-performing (90 days or more past due) loans, NPAit,
measures asset quality.11 Liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash and investments
to total assets, Liquidit. The return on assets, ROAit, is used to measure earnings.
For thrifts prior to the crisis, sensitivity to market risk was essentially equivalent to
interest rate risk; because regulatory filings offer little visibility on the term-structure
of bank assets, I use the ratio of residential mortgage loans to total assets to measure
the banks’ market risk exposure, MktRiskit. Management effectiveness is difficult
to measure with balance sheet data, so I do not include it. All measures based
on ratios are Winsorized at the 2% level and measured in percentages. Because
larger banks are more likely to enjoy implicit government guarantees, I also include
dummies for the bank’s size tercile, Medit, Bigit (the smallest tercile is taken as the
baseline) as an additional risk factor. Because many smaller thrifts are mutual benefit




where EDEPDOMit and DEPIDOMit are SDI data items “Interest expense: Domestic office
deposits” and “Interest-bearing deposits” respectively.
11. The assumption being that portfolios with more performance issues (i.e. sub-prime loans) will
exhibit greater performance degradation during economic downturns or financial crises.
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organizations ostensibly run for the benefit of the depositors, I also include a mutual
dummy, Mutualit to capture potential differences in risk arising from reduced agency
conflicts.
A bank’s cost of funds may be driven by various other (non-risk) factors. To the
extent that these are are correlated with the risk-factors of interest, failing to control
for them would lead to biased estimates. Therefore, I include a number of controls
likely to play a significant role in the cost of funding. First, the competitive position
of a bank may play an important role. Banks with a high market share in their
local market(s) may have difficulties expanding deposits (without increasing funding
costs), while banks operating in concentrated markets may enjoy pricing power. To
control for these effects, I include each bank’s share of the deposit market in which it
operates, MktShareit, as well as the weighted-average Herfindahl-Hirschman index
of deposit market concentration faced by each bank, HHIit.
12.
Another potential factor in a bank’s cost of funds is the rate at which a bank
needs to expand its funding. Banks experiencing rapid growth in assets may need
12. Using the FDIC Summary of Deposits Database, I first calculate each bank’s share of deposits





where DEPOSITSitm is the dollar deposits bank i’s branches located in MSA m, in year t. I then
calculate an aggregate market share for each bank by weighting its MSAShares by the level of







Similar to the calculation of MktShareit described in Footnote 12, I first calculate MSA-level






where m indexes over MSAs. I then calculate a bank-specific Herfindahl-Hirschman index, HHIit








to bid aggressively for deposits and consequently face higher costs. Similarly, banks
without branch networks and banks using brokered (i.e. non-core) funds should also
face higher funding costs.13 To control for these factors, I include asset growth,
AssetGrowthit, a dummy variable, Unitit, indicating a unit bank (one with no
branches), as well as a dummy indicating the use of brokered deposits, Brokerit.
14.
Due to data limitations, I am unable to obtain separate estimates of deposit prices
for insured and uninsured deposits, nor can I obtain separate estimates for deposits
of different maturities. This should generally work to weaken my findings as the
response of insured depositors to risk factors (verifiable or not) is expected to be
attenuated.
I employ three alternative measures of asset-quality (the hits). The first, local
mortgage default risk, LocalRiskit is based on the geographical composition of a
bank’s mortgage originations and acquisitions. Mian and Sufi (2009) has argued that
the Sub-prime Crisis can be traced back to growth of mortgage credit in neighbor-
hoods with stagnant (or declining) income growth. Similarly, Anderson, Capozza,
and Van Order (2011) attribute much of the mortgage melt-down to the extension of
credit in areas with poor economic fundamentals, potentially resulting from banks’
mis-estimation of default risks.15 The local risk measure I construct attempts to
capture this aspect of banks’ lending decisions. To construct it, I begin with ZIP-
code level metrics from University Financial Associates LLC (UFA) that assess the
default risk arising from the local and national economic environment for a loan orig-
inated in a given year.16 I convert the ZIP-code-level data to census-tract-level using
13. A branch network not only increases access to low-cost deposits (i.e. core deposits) but also
increases bank charter value, reducing agency conflicts and depositors’ risk.
14. The smaller units thrifts tend to be community thrifts, while the larger unit thrifts consist of
Internet-based banks (e.g. Netbank, ING Bank FSB) or thrift entities that are a part of a larger
bank holding company (e.g. Citicorp Trust Bank FSB, Capital One FSB).
15. See also Murfin (2012), who provide evidence that banks adjusted underwriting standards to
recent loan loss experience.
16. The UFA metrics are provided at a monthly frequency. I annualize them by weighing the
monthly data by the U.S. Census New One Family Houses Sold series. The metrics are multipliers,
with 1 corresponding to the average default propensity in the 1990s. Additional details can be found
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“crosswalk” mappings provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment.17 Next, I use each bank’s annual loan application register (LAR) to construct
census-tract portfolio weight-vector for each bank-year.18 For each bank-year, I use
the dollar value of loan originations and purchases in a given census tract to compute
the weights. Finally, I multiply the tract-level UFA metrics by this weight vector to
obtain a geographic risk measure (LocalRiskit) for each bank-year. Local economic
conditions are known to play an important role in mortgage defaults (Capozza, Kazar-
ian, and Thomson (1997)); because of this, they may be incorporated into the market
assessment of bank risk. Conversely, political consideration may make it difficult for
regulators to employ this measure: such pressure may even lead them to encourage
lending in imprudent areas.
Whereas the previously described measure (LocalRiskit) captures differences in
asset quality arising from banks’ exposures to local economic conditions assuming
borrower and loan characteristics are held constant, my second measure captures dif-
ferences in asset quality arising from differences in borrower and loan characteristics.
It is based on individual banks’ relative propensity to approve a constant-quality loan
and reflects the looseness (or tightness) in a bank’s underwriting standards. It is ex-
pressed as an over-approval multiplier, OverApprovalit: when the multiplier is unity,
a bank is approving the expected fraction of its loan applications, when it is 1.5, the
bank approves 50% more loans than is expected. To construct this measure, I first
fit a loan application approval model based on loan characteristics using loan appli-
cation data from all banks in my sample. This model estimates the probability that
a loan with a given set of observable characteristics would be approved if assigned to
a random bank with a probability corresponding to the bank’s market share. Using
in the appendix of Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order (2011).
17. These files may be found at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/usps_crosswalk.
html.
18. The LARs are from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act filings described in more detail in the
subsequent sub-section.
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this model, I calculate the expected approval rate for the applications received by each
bank in a given period. The over-approval measure, OverApprovalit is calculated as
the ratio of a bank’s actual approval rate to the expected approval rate (i.e. the rate
predicted by the model). Further details on the construction of this measure can be
found in Chapter IV.
The final measure of asset quality that I consider is based on banks’ future loan
performance. I suppose that investors obtain some unbiased signals about how each
bank’s loans will perform during unfavorable conditions (i.e. when home prices de-
cline, credit is reduced, etc.); if investors monitoring is present, then the signals should
be reflected in investors’ pricing of bank liabilities.19 As such signals are not directly
observable, I use a simple proxy: the bank’s average realized loan delinquencies dur-
ing the Sub-prime Crisis, or “crisis non-performing assets”, CNPAi.
20 To the extent
that the noise in these signals is not correlated with the other regressors, the proxy
CNPAi yields unbiased estimates of the signals’ impact.
I use standard pooled OLS and fixed-effects models to estimate the coefficients.
Pooled OLS has been frequently employed in prior literature despite the implausibility
of the required assumption that unobserved bank heterogeneity is uncorrelated with
bank characteristics (such as capital ratios and earnings). Thus, the fixed-effects
models will be preferred. As bank balance sheets change only slowly, residuals are
highly correlated over time; to deal with this, I cluster standard errors at the bank
level. Throughout, estimation is based on quarterly data, although some of the asset-
quality measures are either cross-sectional (CNPAi), or only vary at the annual
frequency (LocalRiskit and OverApprovalit).
19. Assuming that deterioration in loan performance during a crisis situation increases a bank’s
default risk.





The core of my sample is based on quarterly regulatory filings—Thrift Financial
Reports (TFRs)—filed with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Balance sheet
and income statement data reported in the TFRs are similar to the data reported in
commercial banks’ Call Report filings. I extract this data from the FDIC Statistics
on Depository Institutions (SDI) database which contains TFR filings going back to
1992Q4.21.
I use branch-level data on deposit balances at all U.S. depository institutions to
construct my market structure controls (MktShareit, HHIit). This data is available
at annual frequency through the FDIC Summary of Deposits database; it goes back
to 1994.22.
To construct my measure of a bank’s underwriting, I rely on the bank’s Loan
Application Register (LAR); the LAR is a loan-level report mandated by the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) for nearly all financial institutions engaged in
mortgage lending. It contains detail on borrower and loan characteristics, as well as
the disposition of the loan. This data is available for all years starting with 1992 from
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).23
Sample
In my analysis, I restrict the sample to the “inter-crisis” period that begins with
the end of the S&L Crisis and ends just before the Sub-prime Crisis. Because cri-
sis episodes represent break-downs in the status-quo arrangements, they yield little
insight as to bank investors’ actions during “normal times”. In addition, their inclu-
21. The SDI database is found at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/
22. The Summary of Deposits database is found at http://www2.fdic.gov/sod
23. This data can be downloaded / ordered at http://www.ffiec.gov/HMDA/hmdaproducts.htm.
95
sion would complicate the analysis considerably. Thus, my analysis focuses on the
52 quarters beginning with 1994Q1 and ending in 2006Q4. Over this period, a total
of 58,253 bank-quarter observations relating to 1,938 distinct thrifts were extracted
from the FDIC SDI database.24
I eliminate from this sample all bank-quarters where less than $25M in assets
or less than $10 million in deposits were reported: banks operating on such small
scales are unlikely to be representative. This eliminates approximately five thousand
observations. I also eliminate bank-quarters corresponding to each bank’s first year
and last quarter of operation, as well as quarters in which a bank was involved in a
merger. This filter is intended to eliminate observations from quarters during which a
bank was undergoing major structural changes. Finally, I eliminate all bank-quarters
for which Summary of Deposits are not available. This leaves 51,136 bank-quarters
which yield an unbalanced panel with 1,741 banks. All ratios are Winsorized at the
2% level. The resulting subset of observations is summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
In 1994Q1, filings for 1,668 thrifts were extracted from the SDI database. These
thrifts had $785 billion in assets and deposits of $593 billion. Median thrift assets wer
$102 million with median deposits of $89 million. By the fourth quarter of 2006, only
838 thrifts remained, with total assets of $1,410 billion and $876 billion in deposits.
These figures are representative of the pattern of growth and consolidation of thrifts
during the period; Figure 5.1 plots these trends. Along with the consolidation, came
increased concentration. Table 5.3 lists the largest thrifts at the end of 1993 and
2006; in 1993, the largest thrift was approximately five times larger than the tenth
largest thrift, but by the end of 2006 the largest thrift was sixteen times larger than
the tenth.
During this period, banks in the thrift population increased their use of uninsured
24. Because reporting is on a consolidate basis, I ignore the approximately one hundred observations
relating to thrifts directly owned by another bank; this avoids double-counting. I also ignore a
handful of observations with missing values for key balance sheet variables.
96
deposits. Among all thrifts, the median percentage of uninsured deposits was 2%
at the end of 1993; by the end of 2006, it was 12%. In aggregate, use of uninsured
deposits increased from 4.7% at the end of 1993, to 22% at the end of 2006. Use
of—and growth in—uninsured deposits was correlated with bank size. Figure 5.2
separately plots the median uninsured deposit percentage for small, medium, and
large banks (corresponding to asset terciles). For each category, median uninsured
deposits exhibited a nearly monotonic increase over the 1993–2006 period. The largest
banks were the biggest users of uninsured deposit funding, increasing their use from
3% to 16%, while the smallest banks increased usage from 2% to 9%. The large
increase in the use of uninsured deposits among banks in my sample offers some hope
of detecting the effects of market discipline.
Figure 5.3 plots the median spread in the cost of deposit funding for small-sized
and medium-sized banks (relative to the large banks). Theory suggests that smaller
banks should face higher costs of deposits: large banks are less risky because of
their larger franchise value, too big to fail guarantees, increased opportunities for
diversification, etc. For the most part, this pattern is manifested in the figure: the
spread in the cost of funding for small and medium sized banks is generally positive,
and spikes during crisis episodes.25 The figure also exhibits an interesting feature that
is harder to account for. Around 2003, the spread on small banks’ cost of funding
begins to fall, turning negative in 2005, falling as low as -20bp in late 2006. A similar
pattern exists in the spreads between banks with high levels of uninsured deposits
and those with low levels. This spread is plotted in Figure 5.4: banks with high
levels of uninsured deposits faced increasing costs of deposits between 2002 and 2006.
Over this period, the spread in funding costs between banks in the high- and low-
uninsured terciles increased from approximately -40bp to +30bp. This is consistent
25. In the figure, the spikes occur in 1995, 1998, 2001, and 2008. These are roughly coincident
with the Mexican Peso Crisis, the Asian Financial Crisis, the dot-com bubble, and the Sub-prime
Crisis.
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with uninsured depositors growing increasingly concerned with the risks developing
in the residential mortgage sector. 26
The aggregate patterns are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that uninsured
depositors were responsive to bank risk and took note of the brewing problems in the
residential mortgage sector. However, they are hardly conclusive. In the next section,
I present the results from the micro-level panel analysis.
5.4 Results
Balance Sheet Factors in the Cost of Funds
I begin by examining the effect of balance-sheet-based risk factors on a bank’s
cost of funds. This represents a common approach taken in the earlier literature on
bank monitoring and which is based on the following regression specification:
yit = αt + γ
′xit−1 + β
′fit−1 + εit,
where fit and xit are vectors of balance-sheet derived risk-factors and controls. Table
5.4 presents the estimates of the above specification.
The first column of Table 5.4 corresponds to pooled estimates without the mar-
ket structure controls, while the second includes them. The results from these two
pooled specifications do not offer especially compelling evidence for the monitoring
hypothesis. As expected under the hypothesis, banks with higher earnings (ROAit−1)
do pay less for funding. However, the effect of capital (Capitalit−1) goes the wrong
way: banks with higher capital levels have higher funding costs. This is surpris-
ing given that capital serves as a buffer against liability-holders’ losses and reduces
26. From 2000 to 2002, the spread exhibited a pronounced decline into negative territory. A
plausible interpretation is that banks which depositors perceived to be safe (i.e. larger banks) saw
an influx of deposits following the 2000–2001 dot-com bubble and the uncertainty created by the
World Trade Center attacks. The perceived safety of these banks allowed them to offer lower deposit
rates.
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equity-holders’ incentives to take excessive risks. Non-performing assets (NPAit−1),
and bank size (Medit, Bigit) also appear to have no statistically significant effect
on funding costs. Exposure to market risk (MktRiskit−1), liquidity (Liquidit−1) and
organization as a mutual bank (Mutualit−1) have the expected signs, but the effect
of liquidity, and mutual bank organization do not survive the introduction of the
market-structure controls (column (2)).
While the risk-factors offer a mixed picture, the market-structure controls are
much more consistent. Except for market-share (MktShareit−1), all the controls
are statistically significant. They also have the expected signs: high asset growth
(AssetGrowthit−1), low deposit market concentration (HHIit−1), unit banking (Unitit−1),
and use of brokered deposits (Brokerit−1) are associated with higher costs of funds.
The inclusion of these controls does not materially affect the estimates on the risk-
factors, although the mutual benefit organization dummy (Mutualit−1) looses signif-
icance.
The previous estimates are biased if there exist omitted variables correlated with
both the risk-factors and the cost of deposit funding. This may explain why bank
capital (Capitalit−1) does not have the expected effect; for example, bank-level vari-
ation in risk-appetite may lead “risky” banks to choose higher capital levels in order
to attract funding. Omitted variables that do not exhibit significant variation over
time (e.g. bank-level risk-appetite, reputation, or ownership) can be controlled for
through fixed-effect estimation. In the third column of Table 5.4, I present estimates
from such a fixed-effects model. Now, the estimate of the coefficient on bank capi-
tal (Capitalit−1) takes on the expected sign: controlling for bank-level heterogeneity,
higher capital levels are associated with a lower cost of funding. However, the es-
timate is very small: a one percent increase in capital leads to an 0.3 basis point
reduction in funding cost. The effect of return on assets (ROAit−1) is reduced in
the fixed-effects model: a one percent increase in the return on assets leads to a 6.6
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basis point reduction in the cost of funds. The effect of exposure to market risk
(MktRiskit−1) is again highly significant and in the expected direction. Contrary to
expectations, liquidity (Liquidityit−1), non-performing assets (NPAit), and the size
dummies (Medit−1, Bigit−1) now have statistically significant effects that run counter
to the monitoring hypothesis.
The above analyses of balance-sheet risk-factors is not especially consistent with
the hypothesis that depositors monitor bank risk. In particular, under the fixed-effects
specification, asset quality—as measured by non-performing loans (NPAit−1)—does
not have the expected effect: banks holding more delinquent loans appear to enjoy a
lower cost of funding. To the extent that portfolios with higher rates of delinquency
(i.e. sub-prime portfolios) are more susceptible to further deterioration in bad states,
this appears inconsistent with liability investors’ monitoring of banks’ asset quality.
On the other hand, it may reflect shortcomings in the asset quality measure. In par-
ticular, high levels of delinquencies need not be associated with appreciably increased
risk of default most of the time: it is only when economic or financial conditions
deteriorate that these sub-prime portfolios start to pose a risk.
Time-variability in the Role of Loan Quality
To examine whether the effect of loan performance on banks’ cost of funds is ob-
scured by variability along the time dimension, I augment the fixed-effects model
of Table 5.4, Column 3 with interactions between the time dummies (αts ) and
non-performing assets (NPAit−1). The coefficient estimates from this regression are
presented in Table 5.5, with the time-varying coefficient estimates on the NPAit−1
variable plotted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 shows that throughout my sample period loan performance had no
appreciable (or statistically significant) impact on the cost of funding, although the
estimates appear to decline toward the latter half of the period. If anything, it seems
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that as the crisis approached, investors in bank liabilities took less of an interest in
loan performance.
These results suggest that banks’ past loan performance experience had no appre-
ciable impact on their cost of funding in the pre-crisis period. This could potentially
be explained by the oft-repeated adage that real estate markets are driven primarily
by local factors: perhaps investors were more concerned with lurking local risks in
banks’ loan portfolios rather then their contemporaneous performance characteristics?
Local Risk and the Cost of Funds
To test whether investors took account of variation in the geographical composi-
tions of banks’ loan portfolios and the consequent differences in exposure to local risk
factors, I augment the fixed-effects analysis of Figure 5.4, Column 3, with the measure
of local economic risk exposure, LocalRiskit, described in Section 5.2. As before, I al-
low for time-variation in the effect of this risk exposure by including interactions with
time dummies. The coefficient estimates from this model are presented in column
(2) of Table 5.5 with the time-varying coefficients on the standardized LocalRiskit
variable plotted in Figure 5.6.27
The estimates reveal a striking pattern. Prior to 2001, a bank’s exposure to
risks stemming from local mortgage market conditions was not reflected in its cost of
funds—the estimates are generally statistically indistinguishable from zero. Starting
in 2001 however, the cost of exposure to local risk spikes to approximately 6 basis
points28, and continues to increase throughout the year, reaching a peak of approxi-
mately 15bp. Coincidentally, the UFA National Default Risk Index (which measures
national mortgage default risks arising from economic conditions) began to deteriorate
around the same time (2001–2002) after approximately seven years of improvement.
27. The LocalRiskit variable is standardized by its sample standard deviation.
28. That is, a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s local risk exposure results in a 6 basis
point increase in the cost of funds.
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While the cost associated with a bank’s local risk exposure spiked around 2001,
it did not persist through the pre-crisis period: after spiking, it began a gradual
and nearly uninterrupted decline. By mid-2005, the cost of local risk exposure had
declined to levels statistically indistinguishable from zero. A literal reading of this
pattern would suggest that investors quickly grew concerned about the geographical
composition of banks’ holdings in mid-2000 (shortly after the dot-com bubble), but
that this concern gradually eroded over the next five years.
Over-approval Rates and the Cost of Funds
The declining impact of local economic risk on the pricing of bank liabilities over
the 2001–2006 period raises doubts about monitors’ appreciation of the impending
problems in the mortgage market. To explore this further, I examine their reactions
to another aspect of loan quality: underwriting standards. I repeat the previous
analysis but consider instead the time-varying coefficients on the over-approval rate,
OverApprovalit−4. Again I estimate a fixed-effects model and interact the measure
with time dummies to obtain a time series of coefficient estimates, on the standardized
OverApprovalit−4 variable, which I plot in Figure 5.7.
The effect of the over-approval rate on a bank’s cost of funds bears a similarity
to the pattern for local risk exposure. Prior to 2001, a bank’s over-approval rate had
no obvious effect on the cost of funding. Again, around 2001 the estimates spike to
approximately 3 basis points per one standard deviation change in the over-approval
rate. Unlike the estimated effect of local risk exposure, the estimated effect of over-
approvals persists a bit longer and declines more precipitously in 2003: at its nadir
in mid-2006, it is firmly in negative territory. Again, it appears that concerns about
the safety of bank liabilities declined considerably while problems in banks’ mortgage
books were mounting.
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Crisis Loan Performance and the Pre-crisis Cost of Funds
The evidence thus far suggests that markets began to penalize banks exposed to
local economic risk and banks with loose underwriting standards around 2001–2002.
However, the subsequent years saw a decrease in these penalties—as the sub-prime
crisis neared banks exposed to local risks and those with looser lending standards
did not pay more for their funding. Thus, it appears that participants in the market
for bank liabilities were unaware of banks’ exposures. An alternate possibility is
that my measures of local risk exposure and underwriting standards were playing an
ever smaller role in investors’ assessments of bank risk. Perhaps investors had better
information?
To explore this possibility, I examine when a bank’s crisis exposure was reflected
in its cost of funds. I assume that banks exhibit cross-sectional heterogeneity in their
exposure to a crisis scenario: certain banks pursue strategies that perform badly in
a crisis, while others pursue strategies that perform (relatively) well.29 If investors
monitor, and if they receive signals about banks’ crisis exposures, then these signals
should affect a banks’ cost of funding. Moreover, the signals’ impact on the cost of
funds should be proportional to investors’ assessments of the probability of a crisis
occurring.
A bank’s realized performance during a crisis scenario—here, crisis non-performing
assets (CNPAi)—is used as a proxy for unbiased signals about crisis exposure. Be-
cause banks’ crisis exposures have been assumed to be constant, it is not possible to
identify an overall crisis exposure effect in a fixed-effects model; however, time-series
variation in the effect can be identified.30 To this end, I begin with the fixed effects
regression specification of column two in Figure 5.4 where I regresses cost of deposit
funding (CODFit) on the usual lagged balance-sheet risk-factors and controls. To
29. Of course, banks may have adjusted their strategies over time. For the purposes of identifica-
tion, I assume this away.
30. The overall effect is indistinguishable from bank-level heterogeneity in a fixed effects model.
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control for the effects of historical asset quality, I include interactions between the
time dummies and asset quality (NPA) as in Figure 5.5; in addition, I include lagged
growth in non-performing assets to capture readily observable trends. To identify
time-series variation in the crisis exposure effect, I include interactions between the
time dummies and crisis non-performing assets (CNPAi). Coefficient estimates for
these interactions are plotted in Figure 5.8, while the non-time-varying coefficient
estimates are reported in column (3) of Table 5.5. These estimates correspond to
differences from the baseline period (the beginning of 1994) with the overall crisis
exposure effect unidentified.
The plot of coefficient estimates in Figure 5.8 reveals a pattern very different from
that of the contemporaneous risk measures. Prior to 2005, a bank’s crisis exposure
was most often statistically indistinguishable from zero, with brief spikes (into statis-
tically significant positive territory) in 1995–1996, 1997, and 2000-2001. By mid–2001
the effect is again indistinguishable from zero, but starting in 2003 a consistent up-
ward trend emerges. By mid-2005, crisis-exposure is again reflected in banks’ cost of
funding, and by the end of 2006, a one percent increase in the crisis delinquency rate
is associated with an additional 5 basis points in the cost of funding funding.
5.5 Discussion
The results presented here are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, in the years
preceding the Sub-prime Crisis the markets for bank liabilities seem to have gradually
lost interest in the quality of banks’ assets, banks’ exposures to local risk factors,
and banks’ underwriting standards (Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 respectively). On the
other hand, starting as early as 2003 banks’ crisis exposure seems to have played an
increasing role in banks’ cost of funding (Figure 5.8).31
31. Although statistically significant deviations from the baseline crisis exposure effect (i.e. the
effect in the beginning of 1994) are not observed until 2005, a nearly uninterrupted upward trend
begins in early 2003.
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An explanation consistent with the monitoring hypothesis is that the market for
bank liabilities was focused on an observable aspect of banks’ risk-taking not cap-
tured by my analysis. My sample covers a period that witnessed significant changes
in banks’ underwriting practices: starting around the mid-1990s, banks grew in-
creasingly reliant on automated underwriting systems in which credit scores served
as a key input.32 Unfortunately, the HMDA loan application registers do not con-
tain borrowers’ credit scores; consequently, my measure of underwriting standards,
OverApprovalit, may not adequately capture important aspects of banks’ propen-
sity to “over-approve” loans. Variation in banks’ underwriting standards based on
unreported characteristics may nonetheless have been common knowledge and used
by investors; the increasing “effect” of crisis loan performance on a bank’s pre-crisis
funding cost could have been due to investors applying increasing scrutiny to banks
with a reputation for “working with the borrower” a little too much.
Alternatively, the “effect” of a bank’s crisis exposure on its cost of funds may
not be a causal effect at all. One possibility is reverse causality: if banks faced
heterogeneous shocks to their cost of funding, it could be that banks subject to
positive shocks increased investment in higher-yielding assets in a “search for yield”.
The yield came at a price, one which was not fully revealed until the crisis. Another
possibility is the existence of an omitted factor that simultaneously increased (some)
banks’ funding cost and decreased their future loan performance: shocks to local
economic conditions may be one such factor.
It remains to be seen whether better measures of banks’ underwriting standards
will provide an explanation in which the observed association between banks’ per-
formance in the crisis and their pre-crisis cost of funds reflected market monitoring.
While the results presented here are consistent with some (yet unidentified) form of
complimentary market monitoring, the present analysis does not fully exclude the al-
32. Straka (2000) provides an account of the shift toward automated underwriting systems.
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ternative explanations. However, it does appear that such monitoring—to the extent
that it was present—did not take account of banks’ exposures to the local economic
conditions affecting their mortgage borrowers: although banks’ local risk exposure
was a significant factor in banks’ performance during the crisis, its effect on the cost
of funds was declining prior to the crisis. This provides further evidence that such
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Figure 5.1: Asset and deposit growth in the thrift sector.





























Figure 5.2: Uninsured deposits.
Figure 5.2 plots the fraction of deposits not covered by explicit government guarantees for
the banks (i.e. thrifts) in my sample. The median percentage of uninsured deposits is
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Figure 5.3: Cost of funds (by bank size).
Figure 5.3 plots the difference in funding cost between banks in the small and large size
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Figure 5.4: Cost of funds (by uninsured percentage).
Figure 5.4 plots the difference in funding cost between banks in the high and low percentage
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Figure 5.5: Time-varying effects of non-performing assets on the cost of funding.
Estimates for the time-varying impact of non-performing assets, NPAit−1, on the cost of
banks’ funding. The estimate is obtained from the fixed-effects model:
CODFit = αt + ηi + θtNPAit−1 + γ
′xit−1 + β
′fit−1 + εit,
where the balance-sheet risk-factors, fit−1, and the controls, xit−1, are the same as in the
model described in Table 5.4, Column 3. The thicker solid line is a plot of the estimates of
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Figure 5.6: Time-varying effects of local risk on the cost of funding.
Estimates for the time-varying impact of local mortgage default risk, LocalRiskit−4, on the
cost of banks’ funding. The estimates are obtained from the fixed-effects model:





where the balance-sheet risk-factors, fit−1, and the controls, xit−1, are the same as in the
model described in Table 5.4, Column 3. The LocalRiskit−4 variable is standardized by the
sample standard deviation (denoted by ?). The thicker solid line is a plot of the estimates
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Figure 5.7: Time-varying effects of the over-approval rate on the cost of funding.
Estimates for the time-varying impact of local risk, OverApprovalit−4, on the cost of banks’
funding. The estimates are obtained from the fixed-effects model:





where the balance-sheet risk-factors, fit−1, and the controls, xit−1, are the same as in the
model described in Table 5.4, Column 3. The OverApprovalit−4 variable is standardized
by the sample standard deviation (denoted by ?). The thicker solid line is a plot of the
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Figure 5.8: Time-varying effects of crisis loan performance on the cost of funding.
Estimates for the time-varying impact of a bank’s crisis loan performance, CNPAi, on the
banks’ pre-crisis cost of banks’ funding. The estimates are obtained from the fixed-effects
model:
CODFit = αt + ηi + θtCNPAi + γ
′xit−1 + β
′fit−1 + εit,
where the balance-sheet risk-factors, fit−1, and the controls, xit−1, are the same as in the
model described in Table 5.4, Column 3. The thicker solid line is a plot of the estimates (the
θts); the lighter dashed lines plot the 95% confidence interval. Because crisis loan perfor-
mance is measured at the bank-level (there’s no time variation), the estimates correspond to
differences in cost in each time period—the total impact of crisis loan performance cannot
be identified in a fixed-effects model.
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Table 5.1: Summary of variables (averages).
Average
Variable 1994Q1 2006Q3 Description
Nt 1449 747 Number of banks.
ROAit 0.86 0.66 Net income after taxes and extraordinary items
(annualized) as a percent of average total assets.
Capitalit 19.19 20.92 Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of risk-weighted
assets as defined by the OTS for prompt corrective
action during that time period.
NPAit 1.13 0.70 Total noncurrent loans and leases, loans and leases
90 days or more past due plus loans in nonaccrual
status, as a percent of gross loans and leases.
Liquidit 32.09 23.72 Liquid assets; sum of cash, Fed Funds lent, and
securities divided by total assets.
MktRiskit 60.39 63.54 Exposure to market (interest-rate) risk; ratio (per-
cent) of residential loans to total loans.
AssetGrowthit 3.33 5.77 Quarter-to-quarter growth in assets (annualized).
Unitit 0.22 0.27 Indicator for banks with a single branch.
Mutualit 0.45 0.39 Indicator for banks organized as mutuals.
Brokerit 0.12 0.33 Indicator for use of brokered deposits.
Medit 0.37 0.36 Indicator of a medium-sized bank.
Bigit 0.36 0.36 Indicator of a big-sized bank.
MktShareit 1.59 1.41 Market share of deposits; calculated as the
weighted-average market share from each MSA in
which the bank has a branch.
HHIit 0.07 0.10 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposit market
concentration; calculated as the weighted-average
HHI from each MSA in which the bank has a
branch.
LocalRiskit 0.97 1.68 Exposure to local mortgage default risks; calcu-
lated as the average ZIP-code level life-of-loan
default multiplier for originated (and purchased)
loans.
OverApprovalit 1.09 1.07 Over-approval ratio (multiplier); the bank’s real-
ized approval rate divided by the predicted ap-
proval rate.
FNPAi 2.80 2.94 Crisis non-performing-assets; calculated as the av-
erage non-performing assets in the Sub-prime cri-
sis period.
Table 5.1 summarizes the variables in the panel. Averages are reported for the first and last quarter.
All ratios are winsorized at the 2% level.
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Table 5.2: Summary of variables (standard deviations).
Std. Dev.
Variable 1994Q1 2006Q3 Description
ROAit 0.60 0.62 Net income after taxes and extraordinary items
(annualized) as a percent of average total assets.
Capitalit 9.54 11.86 Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of risk-weighted
assets as defined by the OTS for prompt corrective
action during that time period.
NPAit 1.09 0.83 Total noncurrent loans and leases, loans and leases
90 days or more past due plus loans in nonaccrual
status, as a percent of gross loans and leases.
Liquidit 17.35 16.79 Liquid assets; sum of cash, Fed Funds lent, and
securities divided by total assets.
MktRiskit 18.46 17.83 Exposure to market (interest-rate) risk; ratio (per-
cent) of residential loans to total loans.
AssetGrowthit 15.33 16.20 Quarter-to-quarter growth in assets (annualized).
MktShareit 0.02 0.02 Market share of deposits; calculated as the
weighted-average market share from each MSA in
which the bank has a branch.
HHIit 0.05 0.06 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposit market
concentration; calculated as the weighted-average
HHI from each MSA in which the bank has a
branch.
LocalRiskit 0.25 0.74 Exposure to local mortgage default risks; calcu-
lated as the average ZIP-code level life-of-loan
default multiplier for originated (and purchased)
loans.
OverApprovalit 0.19 0.22 Over-approval ratio (multiplier); the bank’s real-
ized approval rate divided by the predicted ap-
proval rate.
FNPAi 3.42 3.50 Crisis non-performing-assets; calculated as the av-
erage non-performing assets in the Sub-prime cri-
sis period.
Table 5.2 summarizes the standard deviations of the variables in the panel. Standard deviations are
reported for the first and last quarter. All ratios are winsorized at the 2% level.
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Table 5.3: The ten largest and ten smallest banks in the panel.
Bank Name Assets
($ million)
Home Savings of America, FSB 50367
Great Western Bank, A FSB 34989
World Savings and Loan Association, A Federal Savings and
Loan Associati
28394
American Savings Bank, F.A. 17154
Glendale Federal Bank, Federal Savings Bank 16351
First Nationwide Bank, A FSB 15088
California Federal Bank, A FSB 14955
Citibank, Federal Savings Bank 12944
Standard Federal Bank 10643




Greater South Texas Savings Bank 25
First Federal Bank for Savings 25
First Trust Savings Bank, FSB 25
Clover Federal Savings and Loan Association 25
Sun World Federal Savings Bank 25
First Northern Savings and Loan Association 25
Cambria County Federal Savings and Loan Association 25
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Hammond 25
Southwestern Savings and Loan Association of Hugoton 25
North Side Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago 25
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Table 5.4: Effects of balance-sheet risk-factors on banks’ cost of funds.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS FE
ROAit−1 -0.103 -0.105 -0.066
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
Capitalit−1 0.005 0.004 -0.003
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
NPAit−1 0.018 0.012 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006)∗
Liquidit−1 -0.005 -0.003 0.004
(0.002)∗∗ (0.002) (0.001)∗∗∗
MktRiskit−1 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
Medit−1 -0.027 0.034 0.066
(0.029) (0.027) (0.022)∗∗∗
Bigit−1 -0.019 0.045 0.094
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035)∗∗∗












Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 48057 46159 46159
R2 0.786 0.804 0.913
Table 5.4 shows the results of panel regressions of a bank’s cost of funding, CODFit on balance-sheet
based risk-factors:
CODFit = αt + γ
′xit−1 + β
′fit−1 + εit,
where fit and xit are vectors of balance-sheet derived risk-factors and controls, respectively. Columns
(1) and (2) correspond to pooled OLS estimates, while Column (3) presents estimates from a model
with with bank-level fixed-effects. The standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by bank,
allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance (of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5.5: Effects of risk-factors on banks’ cost of funds (time-varying coefficients).
(1) (2) (3)
FE FE FE
ROAit−1 -0.066 -0.055 -0.080
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗
Capitalit−1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
Liquidit−1 0.004 0.006 0.007
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
MktRiskit−1 0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Medit−1 0.062 0.074 0.032
(0.022)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗ (0.030)
Bigit−1 0.089 0.097 0.070
(0.035)∗∗ (0.043)∗∗ (0.047)
Mutualit−1 -0.016 -0.029 0.009
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028)
AssetGrowthit−1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Unitit−1 0.057 0.076 0.060
(0.032)∗ (0.041)∗ (0.045)
Brokerit−1 0.076 0.066 0.070
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗
MktShareit−1 3.473 4.136 3.810
(1.405)∗∗ (1.139)∗∗∗ (2.239)∗








Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 46301 28690 26456
R2 0.912 0.919 0.933
Table 5.5 shows the estimates of the panel regressions described in Figure 5.5 (column (1)), Figures
5.6 and 5.7 (column (2)), and Figure 5.8 (column (3)). The standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by bank, allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-bank correlation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote statistical significance (of two-sided tests) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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